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**REPORT**  
**OF THE**  
**TRIBAL CONTROL AND**  
**DEFENCE COMMITTEE**  
**1931**



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## PART I.

### INTRODUCTORY.

**Origin of Committee.**—Our Committee owes its origin to an Order in Council recorded on the 20th September 1930 in which the Government of India decided “that in view of the financial position steps must be taken at the earliest opportunity to examine and review the whole policy of frontier defence, Army, Royal Air Force and Armed Civil Forces, with a view to preventing further accumulation of military or quasi-military expense and making equivalent reductions for any new recurring expenditure incurred by the scheme\* now approved”. Proposals for the appointment of a Committee for this purpose, its personnel and terms of reference were in due course submitted to the Secretary of State for India and received his approval on the 8th January 1931.

**2. Proceedings of Committee.**—The Committee held several preliminary meetings in Delhi and drew up a questionnaire before it assembled, as the Tribal Control and Defence Committee, on 23rd January 1931. Copies of the questionnaire were sent out to all Civil, Military and Royal Air Force witnesses likely to be able to offer useful opinions and were in most cases in their hands before the Committee formally commenced its work. The questionnaire, which was designedly framed to be exhaustive, is reproduced as Appendix I. Our answers to all the main questions raised in it will be found in the appropriate portions of our report. Our Committee proceeded to Peshawar on the 23rd January and in the course of its sessions there examined fifty-two witnesses, including Sir Steuart Pears, Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, and Sir Robert Cassels, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Northern Command. Of these witnesses five were Indians. A number of tentative conclusions were also from time to time discussed with the Chief Commissioner. As we were expected to report by the middle of March, lack of time precluded our visiting Quetta, unless the journey were made by air. The arrangements for proceeding to Quetta by air on the 2nd March had to be cancelled owing to bad weather, and we returned to Delhi instead. Four important Baluchistan witnesses, Colonel Bruce, Agent to the Governor General in Baluchistan, Sir Charles Harington, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Western Command, the Officer Commanding the Zhob Brigade and the Commandant of the Zhob Militia were accordingly invited to Delhi and examined there after our return to Delhi on the 3rd March, but the necessity for submitting a report without avoidable delay has made it impossible for us to examine Baluchistan witnesses as fully, and consider the Baluchistan problem as carefully, as would otherwise have been desirable. We also examined in Delhi Sir Abdul Qaiyum. Written replies to our questionnaire were received from twenty three other officers (including three Indians) whom for various reasons we decided not to summon for personal examination. The evidence of witnesses was recorded in a summarised form and has not been printed.

**3. Air Staff proposals.**—Shortly after we commenced our sittings a memorandum by the Air Staff—Frontier Defence Committee R. A. F./1—was communicated to us through the Secretary, Army Department of the Government of India, which embodied the Air Staff proposals for the further employment of air power on the North-West Frontier of India. The proposals were presented under a covering note by the Air Officer Commanding R. A. F. in India, and were accompanied by an explanatory memorandum by the same authority. For various reasons we felt some uncertainty in determining our competence with reference to the detailed scheme set forth in the memorandum. This scheme had not been in existence when our terms of reference were framed; further the proposals, though modified largely in India, were the proposals of the Air Ministry, and they had not been communicated to

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\* The scheme for constructing posts and roads on the Khajuri and Aka Khel plains.

the Government of India through His Majesty's Secretary of State for India ; nor of course had they been examined by the Departments of the Government of India concerned. Finally the Air Staff scheme raised questions of detail in connection with the location of troops as well as other important questions with which we had neither the time, nor possibly the qualifications, to deal. It was felt however that our views on the general principle of the utilisation of air power in tribal control and defence might be of assistance to Government when they came to consider the detailed scheme, and in a communication to the Government of India we proposed that we should confine our examination to this general principle in relation to recent history. Our attitude had the approval of Government, and our discussions of this important question have been conducted accordingly.

**4. Assistance given to Committee.**—We take this opportunity of placing on record our appreciation of the assistance given us by the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan and the General Officers Commanding-in-Chief, Northern and Western Commands, and all witnesses, whether officers of the Army or the Royal Air Force, civil officers or non-officials, many of whom had to perform arduous journeys in order to attend our sessions.

**5. Terms of reference.**—Our terms of reference were :—

“(1) To examine and review the existing system of frontier tribal control and defence against tribal incursions with especial reference to the part played in relation to the whole by each of the following :—

- (a) the system of tribal allowances ;
- (b) khassadars and levies ;
- (c) other armed Civil Forces ;
- (d) Royal Air Force ;
- (e) regular troops ;

(2) to examine and consider the principles which underlie existing arrangements in respect of (a) and (b) above and to determine how far these should be approved for future retention and development ;

(3) to examine and consider whether any departure from existing arrangements in respect of the strength, disposition, organisation, co-ordination and mutual relations of (c), (d) and (e) is advisable in order to increase efficiency and promote economy ;

(This examination will necessarily include consideration of the possibilities of the extended use of air power referred to in the conclusions of the Defence of India sub-committee D. I. (A. F.) 1st meeting dated 26th April 1930.)

(4) to examine and consider the policy laid down for the control of Waziristan with especial reference to the objects which that policy was intended to secure, the measure of success attained, the definition of further objects of policy and the means by which they should be pursued ;

(5) to consider the possibilities of retrenchment of expenditure connected with frontier control and defence ; and

(6) to submit recommendations to the Government of India in accordance with the conclusions arrived at after the examination and consideration indicated in paragraphs 1 to 5 above.”

**6. Difficulty of simplification.**—We have throughout our deliberations and in formulating our conclusions done our best towards simplification and uniformity, to observe general principles and apply them consistently. If results in this direction are not very apparent, we must plead not only the complexity of conditions on the frontier which is such that it is very seldom possible to make any general or categorical statement without a host of qualifying clauses, but also the operation of that same human factor to which we

draw attention at more than one point. In the intractable medium of the frontier similar experiments undertaken in adjoining and apparently similar areas have worked out very differently. What is true in Baluchistan is not always true in the North-West Frontier Province and even inside that small province what is true of Peshawar may not be true of Kohat or Hazara and what applies in Bannu often bears no relation to the facts of Dera Ismail Khan.

**7. Recommendations when to take effect.**—All our recommendations are based upon the experience of the past and intended to take effect only when conditions return to normal. But in one sense it is idle to expect that conditions will ever be normal again. Current events in India are unprecedented and what reactions they will have on the frontier it is impossible to say. For the moment the difficulty of the political officer's task seems likely to be increased and the opposition to all projects, such as the construction of the Wana-Razmak road and the protection of the Khajuri and Aka Khel plains may be expected to stiffen. These however are not matters within our control and we have proceeded on the assumption that the changes which are coming will not be introduced on the frontier with undue haste. But from this point of view our Committee could scarcely have sat at a less opportune moment.

**8. Glossary.**—A good deal of special terminology is in use on the frontier, and it may be convenient for us to give a series of definitions and brief explanatory notes showing the sense in which certain current terms, mostly vernacular words are used. These will be found in Appendix II.

**9. Necessity for filling in background to tribal problem.**—Before directly approaching our terms of reference we think it necessary to fill in the background. The material with which to do so has been obtained from the records of the Government of India, to which we had access, from standard books of reference and from the evidence of the witnesses whom we examined.

**10. General statement of the problem.**—The closing decades of the nineteenth century witnessed the definition and delimitation on all sides of the frontiers of Afghanistan. Her eastern boundary was fixed by the Durand Agreement of 1893 which was speedily followed by the demarcation, where conditions admitted, of the Durand Line. From the Hindu Kush in the north to the Koh-i-Malik Siah in the south the Durand Line has been so drawn as to leave, save in one region, between it and the north western border of British India, a belt of mountainous country of varying width, the inhabitants of which for economic or historic reasons are linked with India. The northern portion of this belt is occupied by the small kingdom of Chitral, which was at one time in semi-feudal relations with Kashmir. The southern portion is the home of Baluch and Brahui tribes more or less closely connected with Sind. The central portion is inhabited by Pathan tribes economically dependent upon India, but related by ties of blood and language to the adjoining tribes of Afghanistan and easily aroused, though never controlled, by the rulers of that country, who are themselves Pathans. Chitral need not detain us, and in the south the genius of Sandeman appears to have settled the destinies of Baluchistan, including perhaps even that portion of it which is inhabited by Pathan tribes. Here it is that the confines of British India march for a space with those of Afghanistan, but Baluchistan is in process of being welded into one homogeneous whole and being fitted to take its place in the fullness of time in the Federation of United India. It is only the Pathan tribes of the central belt, between Chitral and the Gumal river, that present in an acute form the problem with which we are concerned. With a few exceptions these tribes are all Sunni Moslems and prone to outbursts of fanaticism when stirred by the preaching of their mullas or by hopes of loot in times of excitement. Those tribes who are in the sphere of North-West Frontier Province are reckoned at about two and a half million souls, with an estimated fighting strength of nearly half a million, of whom about one man in three is armed with a modern rifle. The events of 1919 showed that the Pathan tribes of Baluchistan have also to be taken into account, and with these and the Pathan tribes of Afghanistan, now also

well armed, the figures above given may easily be doubled or even trebled, if the Afghan Government is unwilling or unable to keep its subjects under control. To any one who has any conception of the vigour and mobility of a tribal lashkar\* and of the skill which the tribesmen have learnt in the art of war and the use of their weapons, the gravity of the tribal problem needs no further emphasis.

**11. Pathan intractability.**—The general trend of these tribes has for centuries been eastwards and some of them before the beginning of the nineteenth century had come down from the hills into the plains and valleys on either side of the Indus. Here these more easterly tribes had come within the orbit of the Sikhs and on the annexation of the Punjab in 1848 were naturally included in British India. So intractable is the human material of which these Pathan tribes are composed that even those whose vigour has been sapped by the heat of the plains and who as British subjects have been subjected to disarmament have found means to compel their rulers to make substantial modifications in the local application of the law by which the rest of the country is governed, with the result that methods of procedure are here followed which are unknown elsewhere and decrees are given by the Courts for objects which the law elsewhere has refused to recognise. The same stubbornness which has enabled the Pathan subjects of the Government of India, even though disarmed, to impose their will upon their rulers in matters of law and procedure affecting their daily lives has naturally had even greater scope across the administrative border, and the record of the dealings of the Government of India with the hill tribes shows how often the tribal point of view has had to be reckoned with and to what an extent tribal notions of what was right and proper have had to be satisfied before a settlement with them could be reached. We revert to this topic later.

**12. Its chief factors.**—The chief factors in the tribal problem then are :—

- (a) the virile and martial qualities and the predatory instincts of the tribes ;
- (b) their inaccessibility ;
- (c) their armament and the comparative richness and defencelessness of the adjoining districts of British India ;
- (d) their kinship with and easy access to the Afghan border tribes ;

This statement is taken from the evidence of Colonel Griffith, Resident in Waziristan, and the factors mentioned in it are, he says, of general application. He adds that in special cases the following influences are, or have been, of more or less dominating importance :—

- (e) fanaticism ;
- (f) a general malaise arising from uncertainty as to Government's policy ;
- (g) the economic factor ;
- (h) Afghan intrigue.

To this statement we desire to furnish some comment. Certain parts of tribal territory are at present no doubt very unproductive. In our opinion, on the evidence presented before us, their backward economic condition must largely be put down to the lack of stable government. It is not so much that tribe is often at war with tribe or faction with faction, as the institution of the blood feud, which keeps every man's hand against his neighbour, that keeps them back. In a state of society where a man is practically precluded from the application of capital to the land and compelled to devote any surplus to the acquisition of armament, whether offensive or defensive, and where co-operation between neighbours for a common purpose is a matter of difficulty,

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\* Appendix II. s. v. Lashkar, q. v.

sometimes only to be achieved after delicate and protracted negotiation, the cumulative retarding effect must be immense. Indeed we are inclined to think that this may be the main reason why so much land has gone out of cultivation in Waziristan and in Tirah. The point is of practical importance, because if, as many of our witnesses told us, the ultimate solution of the tribal problem depends upon the extension of Government's control everywhere up to the Durand Line, that control, if it is to have any real bearing upon the economic difficulty, must include sufficient measure of administration to stop or at least effectively check the pursuit of the blood feud. The measure of control at present exercised in Waziristan, which only prevents the tribesmen from taking or attempting one another's lives on the newly made roads and in certain restricted areas, will not suffice. To the factors of general application we would add at least one more—tribal tradition. The Pathan hill tribes have never submitted to a conqueror and have a tradition of independence. They have been accustomed to exclude all attempted intrusion and to prey upon their neighbours; they have come to look upon rapine as worthier than toil. There is yet another factor which we may hope is of especial rather than general application. On this in various discussions Sir Steuart Pears, Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, laid great stress, but we hope that, though preponderant in 1930, it will not be permanent to anything like the same degree. This factor is the connection between the hostile elements among the tribes and subversive movements inside British India.

**13. The economic factor.**—Unproductive though a great part of tribal territory may be under existing conditions, too much stress must not be laid upon the economic factor. Its importance is we think generally exaggerated, with picturesque legends of hungry hills that breed more than they can feed. But poverty has not prevented the tribesmen from paying fantastic prices for their armament or kept down the price of human life or of women in tribal circles. It is in fact only certain sections here and there of whom it has been literally true to say that they must raid in order to live. This point too must be borne in mind in devising solutions. For if conditions are made too easy for the tribesmen in their own country they will lose all incentive to go abroad in search of an honest livelihood, as for example certain sections of the Orakzai, who maintain quite an important colony in Bombay, have long been accustomed to do, and will despise offers of road work even in their own country. This symptom has already appeared in Waziristan. These two factors, *viz.*, that the tribal estate is probably capable of considerable development and that the tribesman will not develop it if too easy a livelihood is provided for him in unnecessary service, have, we think, a bearing on our recommendations as to the solution of the problem.

**14. Solutions.**—Historically, as is well known, the tribal problem has been approached from two very different angles. There is the arm's length or close-border policy of the Punjab school, founded by John Lawrence, and the penetration and control from within school which derives its gospel from the theory and practice of Robert Sandeman, as applied in Baluchistan. Our witnesses who had had experience of the latter generally urged us to advise its adoption in the North-West Frontier Province and held out hopes that it would prove a panacea. The close-border policy by itself obviously offers no final solution. It assumes that the problem is insoluble and aims only at a minimum of trouble and expense from incurably troublesome neighbours. We think that even when Sandeman lived there were, and still are, certain factors to be found among the tribes of Baluchistan, which made the application of his ideas easier there than it would have been among the tribes of the North-West Frontier Province. For one thing, although there are numerous Baluch tribes elsewhere besides in Baluchistan, they do not constitute a solid phalanx penetrating right into the heart of Afghanistan or Persia. For another, in Baluchistan population is exceedingly sparse. As a third factor, the hereditary Sirdars of the Baluch tribes expect and in general receive obedience from their fellows. Again, Sandeman's opportunity came and was grasped before the tribes with which he had to



deal were armed with modern weapons. Our witnesses from the North-West Frontier Province with the example before them of what has been done in Waziristan since 1919 seem mostly to have abandoned the close-border school. But they also recognise that in a Pathan medium and under existing conditions the task of applying a policy based on Sandeman has become very much more difficult. Even Sandeman could not have dispensed with military force. He had his "big stick" in reserve, though he seldom, if ever, used it. But now, our witnesses from the North-West Frontier Province told us, a policy of penetration, if applied to a democratic Pathan tribe, like the Afridis, could not be initiated without the actual use of force and for many years must be based on occupation in force. If they are right, the outlook is indeed gloomy. For, to our thinking, any policy other than that of penetration and civilisation carries the seeds of disruption and, for reasons which we will develop hereafter, we think that any attempt to extend the area of control by force is in the conditions which we envisage in the near future, almost beyond the bounds of expectation. While we are on this subject we should like to add that the bulk of our witnesses from the North-West Frontier Province, while advocating the forcible extension of control up to the Durand Line, seemed to think that, when this had been accomplished, the riddle was solved. That opinion we cannot share. In the first place, such an extension, if the adjoining parts of Afghanistan remained in anything like their present condition, would certainly give rise to serious complications and deprive India of her buffer. Second, and this is of more weight, we cannot accept control by force as an ultimate solution. \* "The only final solution is for the tribes to learn to control themselves" and, we would add, the only possible goal to aim at is their voluntary accretion to the Federation of United India.

**15. The Objective.**—If it be objected that all this is very Utopian and almost beyond the bounds of practical politics, we must admit that this may very likely prove to be true. But we cannot counsel the acceptance of defeat at the start. Several tribes, *e.g.*, the Mohmands and most sections of the Orakzai, especially those who are Shias, have already asked or are said to be ready to ask for closer contact. If, as conditions admit, these opportunities are embraced, if roads, made as cheaply as possible, are extended, if small irrigation projects are encouraged, if hospitals and schools are planted, where a real desire for them exists, if vocational training is given to selected tribesmen—and in all these directions a beginning has already been made—if such a policy is steadily pursued, and if every effort is made to conserve and revive the tribal *sarishta*† and such elements of self-government as still exist, and to widen the outlook and raise the moral standard of the tribesmen, we think it possible that the remaining tribes, seeing how those who have been so treated are advancing in prosperity, will catch the desire for progress and abandon their present self-centred isolation. The India of the past may have been strong enough to keep them at arm's length. The India of the future will do well to seek and maintain closer contact. For if the tribes by some such means as these are not kept or brought within the Indian orbit, they are likely to find another focus, and so far from being the gate keepers of India may not improbably play a very different role.

**16. Effect of constitutional changes in India.**—The problem of tribal control and defence however must necessarily also be considered in its relations to the immense constitutional changes which are impending in India. The North-West Frontier Province will become a separate constitutional unit within which administration of the settled districts will be subject to a very large measure of popular control. Tribal control and defence will remain a matter of Central responsibility which will be discharged through the head of the province. The change is likely to affect the present elastic arrangements whereby political officers in charge of settled districts have both *cis*- and *trans*-border functions, and the separation of duties will tend towards a duplication of establishment and therefore towards a more expensive regime. Lack of touch between the *trans*- and the *cis*-border activities of Government

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\* Evidence of Mr. Dundas, Political Agent, North Waziristan.

† Appendix II s. v. *Sarishta* q. v.

will be a real danger which it will be the difficult task of the head of the provincial administration to combat. At the Centre although tribal control and defence will fall within the portfolio of a Defence Minister whose tenure of office may not depend on the support of the Legislature, the constitution of an Indian Government responsible to an Indian electorate in all matters save defence, foreign relations, and relations with Indian States must inevitably affect the administration of those subjects at present reserved from popular control. The new reforms settlement must introduce an expensive system of administration, and with ministers responsible to an electorate there will be a demand for increased expenditure on popular services with a tendency to the remission of taxation by which these services are supported. There may be a disinclination to acquiesce in the spending of money on development of trans-border areas which will reduce the amount available for the development of administered India. The separation of Burma will probably also impair somewhat the financial resources of India. It may be expected therefore that there will be continuous pressure for the curtailment of expenditure on tribal control and defence, and a policy which ignores these tendencies can hardly be regarded as a practicable one. Further more rapid Indianisation of the Army in India has already been adopted as a deliberate policy, and demands may be expected, growing more and more insistent, that a responsible government in India should control its own army, and again these factors must be given due weight in framing policy. Finally there is the vision of a Federal ideal for the whole of India which will fail in its full realisation if it does not include in its ultimate stage all the units which occupy the area between the border of administered India and the Durand Line. All the reasons which justify the inclusion of the Indian States in the Federation apply in a scarcely less degree to these communities whatever be their system of Government.

**17. Growth of expenditure.**—One of the most important factors which must condition the policy of tribal defence and control, perhaps the most important factor, is that of finance. The history of the past thirty years on the North-West Frontier of India is one of immensely growing expenditure. The Finance and Revenue accounts of 1901-02 show the total charges of the North-West Frontier Province as Rs. 31·62 lakhs of which only Rs. 10·83 lakhs was political. The corresponding figures for the Baluchistan Agency were Rs. 24·79 and Rs. 16·59 lakhs. Military expenditure under the Punjab Command for 1901-02 was Rs. 499·40 lakhs. The total civil expenditure for 1929-30 on the North-West Frontier Province as worked out for the Round Table Conference was Rs. 339·51 lakhs of which the share attributable to the tribal area was Rs. 172·66 lakhs; of this practically the whole is made up of political charges and Frontier Watch and Ward, including buildings and communications (Rs 50·13 lakhs). Exactly corresponding figures for Baluchistan cannot be prepared; but the outlay against the grant for Baluchistan for 1929-30, which excludes civil and irrigation works, was Rs. 76·23 lakhs of which political and Watch and Ward charges amount to Rs. 44·68 lakhs: in addition Rs. 8·2 lakhs were spent on Watch and Ward building and communications. For the same year the military expenditure on the Districts of Peshawar (excluding the Risalpur Cavalry Brigade), Kohat, and Waziristan, the Zhob Independent Brigade and the two battalions of covering Troops in Pishin and Quetta, as well as on the Royal Air Force in Kohat, Peshawar and Risalpur is about Rs. 650·91 lakhs. This amount includes Rs. 8·32 lakhs for cavalry regiments in Peshawar, and Kohat which become part of the Field Army in war: the figure is for direct expenditure only and omits a large portion of indirect expenditure for the calculation of which much time would be required. Approximately therefore the recurring expenditure on frontier defence Military and Civil has reached the very large figure of Rs. 818·12 lakhs and there is in addition heavy expenditure on buildings and communications which in 1929-30 on the civil side alone reached the total of Rs. 58·40 lakhs. Undoubtedly the rise in prices and the increases in pay to all servants of Government, Civil and Military, account for a considerable portion of the increase, and changes in classification may in some degree make comparisons difficult; but, it may

be surmised, a considerable portion is left to be explained by increased commitments and a policy of heavy insurance against risk. In any case a figure of well on to nine crores of rupees is, even on present day reckoning, a large portion of the income of India to be spent on tribal control and defence.

**18. Fundamental conclusions on which recommendations are based.—**The statement of political, constitutional, and financial conditions which has been made in the foregoing paragraphs leads to a summarising of the fundamental conclusions with reference to which all our recommendations have been made.

- (a) There cannot be any radical change or reversal of the policy which is at present being carried out on the Frontier. There may be some who would like to see a withdrawal everywhere of our forces, regular and otherwise, to defences behind the administered border. Such a movement might have catastrophic results, would involve the writing off, as sheer waste, of all the expenditure in Waziristan, would indeed begin a movement which might have as its logical and ultimate conclusion a withdrawal to the other side of the Indus, a state of affairs which we prefer to consider as unthinkable.
- (b) Equally impracticable do we consider the extension to other tribal areas of a policy of occupation initiated by force such as has been carried out in Waziristan ; and we rule out as impracticable the opinions of those, and they are many, who see in the occupation of Tirah the only possible solution of the Afridi problem. It is claimed that the occupation of Tirah might eventually lead to a reduction in covering troops ; but apart from the fact that the occupation of Tirah will produce a new, and at present an incalculable situation *vis a vis* the Afghan frontier, history has shown how occupation tends to lead to a multiplication of commitments, and we hesitate to trust to the assurances that an advance into Tirah which would involve immediately great expense, ultimately would prove to be the economical policy.
- (c) As has already been explained we are in favour of a policy of peaceful penetration and civilisation in whatever way that may be possible. Were the recommendation of the Simon Commission to treat the frontier problem of India as an Imperial responsibility to be accepted both by His Majesty's Government in Great Britain, and by the Government of India, the ideal might be possible of attainment within a period comparatively short as history reckons time. But we fear that the decision already given against this proposal is not likely to be reversed ; and in any case we can not base our recommendations on an assumption to the contrary. We therefore think it probable that India will be called upon to meet in full from reduced resources the cost of whatever policy may be approved to meet the tribal problem. We have given our reasons for thinking that a policy based on that of Sandeman is likely to give best value for money, though it will take time to develop. We accordingly suggest that a policy on these lines be formally approved, to be introduced as opportunity may offer, and that a decision be taken to use for this purpose some part of the savings which we foresee as possible in other directions, and which we believe will increasingly accrue when confidence in air power is more generally established.
- (d) Limited as future policy will be by financial conditions more difficult than those of the past, it must provide for a gradual curtailment of expenditure. The present policy should continue, but by cheaper methods. It will be contended that the cheapening of method must involve increase of risk. Some

maintain that the present policy is one of over-insurance, and that some reduction of the premium is possible without serious menace to safety. We consider that whether it is desirable or not some reduction in the extent of insurance is inevitable, and we believe that the existence of air power not only renders the reduction in insurance more apparent than real, but that further experience of this weapon will show economies to be possibly greater than any that can be proposed by us at this stage.

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## PART II.

## NORMAL POLITICAL CONTROL AND THE CIVIL ARMED FORCES.

## (A) TRIBAL ALLOWANCES.

19. **The system of tribal subsidies.**—In considering the problem of tribal control we find it necessary to divide it into two aspects. There is the normal situation in which such measure of control as is maintained over the tribes is exercised by the political authorities without the use of force, by political methods, or with the support only of the civil armed forces. Again there is the abnormal situation when an emergency has arisen to cope with which these instruments are no longer adequate and recourse must be had to the armed forces of the Crown. The first instrument of tribal control is the system of subsidies or tribal allowances. The total sum paid annually by the Government of India in subsidies to the frontier tribes, including the subventions granted to individual Rulers, such as His Highness the Mehtar of Chitral and the Nawabs of Dir and Amb, is Rs. 8·86 lakhs. We were told by one of our expert witnesses\* that the sum paid as allowances to the most heavily subsidised tribe, the Tirah Afridis, represents something between two and four annas in the rupee of their total income. But despite some ambiguity of purpose and declaration when allowances were sanctioned we do not think that they could generally have been intended as a complete or even partial solution of the tribal economic problem. At any rate our witnesses are agreed that, with the exception above indicated, they are not now a material factor in tribal prosperity, and if so now, can never be a permanent solution. Disputes over their distribution have given rise to much trouble in the past and are likely to do the same again hereafter, but their utility as a steadying factor is well attested in all but times of the greatest excitement, when all material considerations are apt to be suddenly burnt up in the fire of tribal feeling or religious enthusiasm. On this steadying power and on certain other considerations must rest their justification. Of these other considerations not the least important is the fact that they are now so well established an institution on both sides of the Durand Line that a tribe which received none from either Government would regard itself as having no relations with either Government, and the position that any tribe dwelling to the east of the Durand Line should have no relations with the Government of India is not one that can be accepted. Suspension or forfeiture for a period of allowances has often been made, but the extinction of an allowance once granted and drawn has, we believe, never been attempted and is regarded as impossible. It would be resented as an unforgivable insult and no relations with the tribe would be possible until either it had been subjugated or amends had been made. Even reduction is thought by our witnesses likely to be attended with similar consequences in such measure as not to be worth while. One reason for this is that as between tribe and tribe, section and section, man and man, the scale of allowances received has come to be regarded as something in the nature of a warrant of precedence, and Pathan pride is proverbial. Adjustment of inequalities is therefore only practicable by a process of levelling up and the grant of new allowances or the increase of old is consequently to be approached with the greatest caution. In these opinions we concur.

20. **Amount paid annually.**—It is not our intention to trace the history of the grant of allowances to the tribes or to examine the questions arising out of the practice more exhaustively than is necessary to enable us to offer constructive suggestions.

The amounts at present being paid as annual allowances to the Frontier Tribes are shown in a table contained in Appendix III. This table affords a good illustration of what we sought to demonstrate in an earlier paragraph. It represents the crystallised results of repeated conflicts of will between the Government of India and the tribes and shows very clearly that it is not only what Government may think right and proper but also what the tribes think right and proper that has to be taken into account by those who deal with frontier problems.

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\*K. B. Risaldar Moghal Baz Khan, Assistant Political Agent, Khyber Agency, who is himself an Afridi.

**21. Purposes for which subsidies are given.**—The witnesses whom we examined were generally agreed that the legitimate purposes for which allowances might be given could be summed up under three heads, *viz.* :—

- (a) to secure goodwill,
- (b) as a return for facilities given or as compensation for rights assumed in tribal territory,
- (c) to provide salaries for selected tribesmen through whom Government might find it convenient to transact its business with the tribe.

As an example of payment in return for facilities we may cite the increased allowances granted to the Utmanzai Wazirs of the Tochi in 1922, when the Razmak policy was sanctioned and Government required greater freedom of action for the movement and location of troops in their country. The stock instance of rights assumed is the Khyber, where, though nothing is said about this in the agreements with the Tirah Afridis, Government collects and keeps the tolls paid by traffic through the Khyber Pass and compensates the tribes for their loss of revenue by the payment of allowances. The actual sum received as Khyber tolls in 1927-28, the last year in which conditions were normal, was Rs. 1·27 lakhs, while the Afridi allowances amount to Rs. 2·8 lakhs, having been doubled in 1915 as a reward for good behaviour and further increased in 1921 in connection with the construction of the railway and the doubling of the Khyber Road. The same tribe again affords a good illustration of the third purpose which allowances may reasonably be intended to fulfill. All relations with the Tirah Afridis have for many years, at any rate in theory, been conducted through the medium of fifteen sectional maliks\* whose personal salaries now amount to an appreciable portion (Rs. 72,000) of the total sum sanctioned for the tribe. These salaries were fixed on a generally handsome scale to enable these maliks to dispense lavish hospitality, which is the basis of influence in tribal circles, and thus maintain a measure of control over their fellows. It cannot however be claimed that this policy among the Tirah Afridis has had more than a very partial success. Similar attempts have been made in Waziristan to build up strong maliks by money payments. Allowances are no doubt generally effective in proportion as the number of their recipients is decreased, but apart from the shortsighted cupidity of the recipients these attempts, where they have run counter to the natural democratic tendencies of a tribe, have generally failed. We find that amongst the more markedly democratic tribes, such as the Afridis, Wazirs and Mahsuds, there is a strong tendency not only to subdivide maliki\* allowances almost to vanishing point, but to treat each payment as if it were an hereditary and sacred right. In the Tochi this has crystallised and must be accepted. Amongst the Mahsuds, with the limitation that caution must be exercised in attempting to reduce the total share falling to any section, this contention has been and is being successfully challenged. Amongst the Afridis, we understand, the position is still fluid and will be re-examined when the next settlement is made. Although it may be doubted whether monetary support alone is sufficient to build up strong maliks, the policy of trying to evolve such by all legitimate means appears to be a sound one and in these days, where monetary support can, as in Waziristan, be given in other ways in our opinion it should be given with this intention, as part of the general policy which we advocate.

**22. Allowances to secure good will.**—We regard payments for facilities and rights and as salaries as at least in principle unobjectionable, but with respect to the payment of allowances to secure good will the position is much more likely to be challenged. Such a payment may be comparatively innocuous, as in the case of the Tochi Wazirs above mentioned, or it may be almost indistinguishable from blackmail, as in the case of their neighbours, the Mahsuds, on whom partial occupation and some liberty of movement for troops were only forced at the point of the sword. In numbers, according to standard figures of fighting strength the Mahsuds (18,000) only slightly exceed the Utmanzai Wazirs (15,000). The facilities which Government enjoys in

\*Appendix II s. v. Mahks and Maliki q. v.



Mahsud country, whither it made its way by force, are less than it enjoys in Utmanzai Wazir country, to which it was invited. But the Mahsud allowances (Rs. 1,08,000 per annum) are half as much again as the Tochi Utmanzai Wazir allowances (Rs. 72,000 per annum). These remarks are not intended to convey adverse criticism, but it is difficult to resist the conclusion that, in some instances at least, those tribes who have given, and are in a position to give, most trouble, have got the largest share. This should not however excite surprise, nor does the grant of allowances to secure goodwill stand thereby condemned. It is precisely because in the past Government had no other convenient means of control, or in other words because the tribes as a whole, or particular tribes, were in a position to bring pressure to bear, that the goodwill allowance was granted. If the slate were clean, now that Government has the power of punishment by air, it might be possible to dispense with payments for goodwill. But the slate is not clean. Tribal allowances, into which the purchase of goodwill element enters, are an old institution, and tribal opinion, will oppose to the last their extinction or reduction. They are therefore an instrument of tribal control which must be retained, and if retained must be subject to development.

**23. Our recommendations.**—We do not at all intend to imply by this continual and indefinite increase. On the contrary the measures which Government is now taking on the Khajuri Plain, if carried through, will prove to the Afridis of Tirah, who pull the stroke oar in the tribal boat, that Government is capable of firmness and is not to be squeezed beyond a certain point. We therefore think, and we understand that the Chief Commissioner agrees, that when the settlement comes to be made with the Tirah Afridis, on no account should any increase in their allowances be sanctioned, except possibly a very small sum for certain petty Jowaki sections who have hitherto been altogether excluded. The Tirah Afridi allowances, once fixed, can be treated as a scale to which all other allowances should be pegged. The Chief Commissioner should be called upon to give expert advice as to the relative importance of the other tribes, with regard not only to their size, numbers and location, but also to the measure of Government's probable activities in their country, the degree to which Government can exercise control by other means and the fact that the Tirah Afridi allowances are based upon receipts from the Khyber tolls. From time to time this estimate may require revision, but in any future revision which may become the basis of proposals for increase, the purchase of good will element should we suggest so far as possible be omitted, and no increase should be proposed except on the basis of new responsibilities and new agreements. Some readjustment of allowances to certain tribes, such as the Mohmands, Afridis of the Kohat Pass and Orakzai may (and in the case of the Mohmands probably will) be necessary before very long, but so long as the Tirah Afridi allowances are not increased no serious expenditure will be involved, and from the financial point of view the prospect can be regarded with equanimity.

**24. Possibility of devotion to more useful purposes.**—There is yet one further possibility. With the development of means of making money in other ways the actual material benefit of tribal allowances to the recipient is becoming of secondary importance. Indeed they are already in many instances of more social than material importance. The tribesman's pocket may be touched provided that his pride is left intact. The Afridis and other tribes have upon occasion contributed quite handsomely from their allowances for purposes in which they were interested. In pursuit of the policy which we have advocated we suggest—and our suggestion is backed by an expert\* of the highest order—that maliks might be encouraged to devote their stipends or portions of them to the common benefit. The maintenance of a bed in a hospital or a scholarship in a school—to be named after the donor—might become an object of emulation, and emulation amongst Pathans is a force which knows practically no limits. If this idea could be developed it would give Government the best return which it can expect for an expenditure which it is unable to reduce.

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\*Nawab Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum, K.C.I.E.

## (B) KHASHADARS.

**25. Khassadars ; a tribal organisation.**—Khassadars are a form of armed force and in our terms of reference are coupled with levies. It might therefore seem that the proper place for dealing with them would be after our discussion of District Levies. To do this would however be a mistake. The khassadar is primarily a tribesman and a representative of his tribe and only secondarily an armed man. The khassadari system is very closely linked with that of tribal allowances. Indeed the two are complementary portions of one whole. We therefore proceed to deal with the khassadar now.

**26. Historical and Explanatory.**—The Afghan Government has from old time had irregular formations in its employ known as khassadars. The name was apparently first adopted on the Indian side of the Durand Line in 1906 when some Mullagori tribesmen and Shilmanis were employed as khassadars in the Khyber Agency for the protection of work on the Shilman railway. These khassadars were paid a basic wage of Rs. 10 per mensem. In 1908 200 Khassadars on a basic wage of Rs. 11 per mensem were engaged in the Malakand Agency for the protection of cooli camps on the Swat River Canal, which was then under construction. Both these bodies are still in existence and employed on protection duty. But the first employment of khassadars on the scale of pay now generally current (Rs. 30 per mensem) took place in the Khyber Agency in 1920, when after the disbanding of the Khyber Rifles about 600 local tribesmen, mainly Afridis, were enrolled at an annual cost of Rs. 2·75 lakhs. The Government of India at that time endeavoured to fix the basic pay at Rs. 20 per mensem, but the local officers were insistent that under the conditions then existing the scheme (under which, it must be remembered, the men were to provide their own weapons) had no chance of success at a lower rate than Rs. 30. The Government of India gave way. Since then the number of Khassadars employed in the Khyber Agency has been increased to 1,384, of whom 1,121 are Afridis and the annual cost is Rs. 5·74 lakhs. The proportion of the estimated fighting strength of the Afridi tribe employed as khassadars is 2·7 per cent. The employment of another very large force of khassadars was sanctioned in 1922 in Waziristan, in connection with the Razmak policy. Of necessity the Khyber scale of pay had to be adopted. The number of khassadars then sanctioned and now employed in Waziristan is distributed as follows :—

North Waziristan Agency—					
Utmanzai Wazirs	..	..	..	..	1,688
Bannu District—					
Utmanzai	} Wazirs	..	..	..	368
Ahmadzai					
Bhitannis					
South Waziristan Agency—					
Mahsuds	..	..	..	..	1,713
Ahmadzai	..	..	..	..	427
Dera Ismail Khan District—					
Bhitannis	..	..	..	..	275

The total number is 4,471 men and the cost of the khassadar force connected with Waziristan is Rs. 18·46 lakhs. The proportion of the estimated fighting strength of the tribe employed as khassadars ranges from about 20 per cent. (Mohmit Khel, Manzar Khel, and Khojal Khel) to 3·2 per cent. (Madda Khel). In the case of the Mahsuds it is 12½ per cent. The only other tribe from which a considerable force of khassadars is recruited is the Mohmands who furnish 233 men on a basic wage of Rs. 20 per mensem and at a total annual cost of Rs. ·6 lakhs. The Mohmand khassadars are normally employed to hold the towers along the blockade line on the border of the Peshawar District between the Swat and Kabul rivers and the nature of their function explains the lower rate of pay. They were first enlisted in 1920 to replace the Mohmand Militia, a temporary war time unit, which in turn had been raised to relieve troops.



**27. Circumstances in which khassadar Forces were raised.**—It will be noticed that the Afridi, Mohmand and Waziristan khassadars have all come into existence since the war and their beginning was made at a time when military commitments were being reduced. The notion that khassadars would perform more cheaply certain functions previously discharged by troops was taken into account when they were raised and men's minds were then still to some extent under the influence of war conditions. These considerations taken by themselves would suggest that, if their numbers cannot be radically cut down, at least the conditions of khassadar service should now everywhere be revised, their pay cut down and their numbers, where in excess of actual and immediate requirements, reduced. Unfortunately other considerations have also to be taken into account. The same reasons which make extinction or reduction of tribal allowances impracticable apply also to Khassadari, and these reasons are even stronger in the case of Khassadari since the money paid by Government percolates into the lower strata of the tribe, and any drying up of the sources has a wider effect. Once again, it is not only what Government may think right or proper, but also what the tribes think right and proper and the form which their protests will take, if their views are disregarded, which has to be considered.

**28. Khassadar characteristics.**—Too much stress can scarcely be laid upon the essentially tribal character of the khassadar. For the moment this has its drawbacks. Khassadars, being tribal representatives, cannot be relied upon to oppose the will of their tribe or section, if that is in opposition to the will of Government, and so they earn for themselves, especially from military critics who see in them only armed men, the reputation of being untrustworthy. Khassadars will not, as a rule, shoot to hit, in the service of Government, which is unable to protect them from the resultant blood feud. They cannot be expected to arrest tribal offenders, if tribal opinion does not approve, as it usually does not, one-sided extradition between themselves and Government. At a time of general tribal excitement they are liable to be swept off their feet. But their tribal nature is not wholly disadvantageous. On the contrary, it is their strong justification and claim to retention. The khassadar is an integral portion of the tribal fabric, intimately connected with the malik and with the system of tribal allowances or maliki on which tribal cohesion so largely depends. He is also, or should be, in intimate association with British officers, not only those of the Political Department, and other representatives of a higher or at any rate a different civilisation and the outer world. He is thus peculiarly well placed alike to educate and to be educated. Rightly used he is already becoming, as recent events in Waziristan show, a useful instrument for penetration, mental and moral as well as physical, and the civilisation which follows it and he is beyond question a stabilising factor, and will be a damper of increasing potency in each successive explosion.

**29. The right use of khassadars.**—These reflections lead us to venture some observations and some recommendations, of general or particular application, which flow from the underlying principles. We are aware that there is nothing new in these and nothing which expert frontier officers have not preached and practised, but it may be convenient to have them collected and set out. The Khassadari system, where established, having become an integral portion of the tribal fabric, any reduction of pay or numbers which would have the effect of permanently reducing the total sum paid to any tribe, section or sub-section is likely to be regarded by them, if introduced without delinquency on their part, as a breach of faith and to have dangerous and disruptive consequences. Subject to what is said below therefore we cannot make any recommendation for an immediate reduction of pay or indeed any reduction which will result in present financial relief to Government, but we can and do recommend that the basic wage of Rs. 30 be somehow brought down to Rs. 25 and we venture some suggestions later as to method. In any new recruitment of khassadars *en bloc* which may be undertaken the determining factor must be the actual permanent needs of Government. In distributing Khassadari service, the jirga concerned must be fully consulted as to distribution of service and its agreement to reasonable compromise secured, if necessary by withholding distribution.

Khassadari can be freely suspended or withheld as occasion may require. The location of khassadars who have not a definite task to perform, and who cannot be inspected and paid *in situ* by the officers of Government, more especially British officers, is difficult to justify. Khassadars, being essentially tribal, should not be located anywhere but in tribal territory. Reduction being difficult or impossible the constant aim of Government should be to secure better and ever better value for the money which it expends on Khassadari, so as in time to make the khassadars a real tribal police like the Baluchistan levies. This can be done by the educative process, the reward of merit and the punishment of default.

**30. Recommendations.**—Our recommendations of general or particular application in the light of these principles are :—

(a) In the Khyber Agency, where the khassadars have continued to function and held aloof from the tribal movement, it is not practicable to reduce the pay of these now serving. It would however seem possible to reduce the basic wage for new recruits from Rs. 30 to Rs. 25. The same applies also to Waziristan. If the tribes insist upon it Government might agree to enlist six men in place of five now serving, and employ the additional numbers in places where additional khassadars will be required, *e.g.*, in the Khyber, on the Khajuri and Aka Khel plains, in advance of the new military posts, or on the proposed Ali Masjid—Chora track and in Waziristan on the new Razmak-Wana road, in the Khaisora etc.

(b) We understand that the local authorities are considering taking a new agreement from the Mohmand assured clans for the defence of their western limits against the upper clans. This project would involve, though not necessarily at once, the construction of a track for thirty miles up the Gandab valley, the location of a force of khassadars at Khapak and Nahakki, and making permanent at least part of the temporary force of 210 khassadars which are at present in addition to the 233 permanent khassadars. If political and financial conditions rendered a forward policy of peaceful penetration possible and advisable and the Mohmand tribes involved invited our help, the opportunity would be one to be seized. As it is however acceptance of the proposal seems to involve a permanent commitment to provide for a temporary contingency, and we are not satisfied of its advantages. If these proposals be not accepted the temporary force of 210 khassadars should be abolished and an effort should be made to allow vacancies in the permanent force, which is not required on the blockade line, to remain unfilled. The basic wage should not, in any event, be increased.

(c) In Waziristan, if it is decided to complete the Razmak-Wana road, the Mahsud and Ahmadzai Wazir jirgas will certainly attempt to secure more khassadars. We think that every effort should be made to avoid permanent commitments and therefore to entrust protection to badraggas.\* In the last resort some fresh recruitment from the Shakai Wazirs may be necessary and some additional recruitment from the Mahsuds and Wana Wazirs. If adding permanently to the khassadar force cannot be avoided, Government will, we think, be well advised to acquiesce in this, attempts being made to reduce the wage generally from Rs. 30 to Rs. 25 on the lines indicated above, *i.e.*, on the six for five principle. If so, North Waziristan will have to conform and there the additional numerical strength should not come into being until the tribes concerned have agreed to the location of posts in areas in which they have hitherto resisted penetration.

### (C) THE ECONOMIC WEAPON.

**31.** Although we have advocated less reliance on force and greater reliance on other factors, we are not so sanguine as to hope that the elimination of force is at all within the bounds of present possibility. One form of force, which in the past was considered un-objectable and by which on at least one occasion remarkable results were achieved, is the use of the economic weapon.

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\*Appendix II s. v. Badragga q. v.

### 32. Its limitations under present conditions and our recommendations.—

When we said that in our opinion the importance of the economic factor has generally been exaggerated, we did not intend to imply that tribal territory is economically self-supporting. The tribesmen have always been accustomed to depend upon the markets of India and, to a less extent, of Afghanistan for articles which they are unable to manufacture or produce for themselves, and although their food supplies may in general be sufficient at a pinch for their wants, it should at least in theory still be practicable to bring some degree of pressure to bear on them by the use of the economic weapon. The general trend of conditions however seems to be militating against this. So long ago as in 1877-78 a blockade of the Mahsuds was enforced with conspicuous success, but when this measure was repeated in 1901-02 it did not suffice to bring the tribes to their knees; nor did the Mohmand blockade of the closing years of the Great War. With the emergence of the tribes from their former seclusion and the development of motor traffic which has taken place of late years both in India and Afghanistan the difficulties of isolating any tribe have much increased. For example, we were assured and are prepared to believe that so long as the Khyber Pass remains open any attempt to blockade the Tirah Afridis (which in any case could not be done effectively without including the Orakzai in the same measure) must be futile. The same applies elsewhere and the difficulty is of course all the greater in areas where, as in Waziristan, the forces and representatives of Government live in among the tribes. Our conclusion therefore is that if it is only a single tribe or section which has to be dealt with, a blockade is not likely to compel their submission, because the difficulties attending the supervision and control of trade with them are too great. The offenders can perhaps be made uncomfortable, but no more, and it is doubtful whether the attempt is worth while. In the event of a general tribal rising, provided that internal security is maintained, a general blockade is easier than a particular blockade, but is impracticable unless Afghanistan is also blockaded, which of course is impracticable except in war. There are however certain specific commodities such as salt, cloth, iron and leather goods, for which the tribesmen generally are peculiarly dependent upon British India, and we think that the normal course of trade in these things is worth examination and the possibility of making it subject to license and control in emergency worth consideration.

### (D) DISTRICT LEVIES.

**33. Strength and cost.**—We now come to the Civil Armed Forces, other than Khassadars, which are maintained by Government in the North-West Frontier Province. These are (I) District Levies, (II) Frontier Constabulary, (III) Scouts. In accordance with our general plan we sought somehow to simplify and reduce these to a more uniform basis. In this attempt however we met with little success, for a variety of reasons into which it is perhaps not necessary to enter. We will therefore proceed to deal with them separately and will begin with District Levies. These are composed of tribesmen recruited from cis-border villages, armed and paid by Government for the protection of particular areas where special protection is necessary. The total strength (in round figures) of District Levies maintained in the North-West Frontier Province, inclusive of those in the Shia Salient, is 1,378 men and the annual cost Rs. 3,47,000. Of these Levies 700 men costing Rs. 2,11,000 are temporary or emergency levies.

**34. Alternative policies.**—The policy of assisting the villagers of the districts of the North West Frontier Province with arms and, where necessary, money to defend their own homes is a natural development of the indigenous chigha\* system. It is cheap and consequently attractive, and the Civil Armed Forces Committee looked to it as the ultimate solution of the problem of the internal defence of the border. It is therefore not without reluctance that we discard it.

We do so for the following reasons:—

- (1) Except in the Kohat District it has generally proved unsatisfactory in practice.

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\*Appendix II s. v. Chigha q. v.

- (2) It stimulates local jealousies and rivalries and tends to prove an obstacle to general progress.
- (3) It involves the distribution of large numbers of rifles to the people of the districts and with the advent of political reforms it seems only prudent to insist that the people of the North-West Frontier Province should be in the same state as regards disarmament as the people of other provinces in India and indeed all civilised countries.
- (4) A variety of causes seem to have combined to produce, except in the Kohat District, a progressive deterioration in the power of the population to defend itself. We cannot suppose that, in spite of the recent lull in raiding from across the border, that phase of tribal activity will never re-appear. Consequently protection is still necessary; if the people are not to protect themselves, they must be protected by Government agency. The obligation of protection against raiders from across the border is therefore one which Government must, except in special cases and for special reasons, accept and discharge.

**35. Exceptions.**—We recognise as special cases those villages along the actual border which enjoy a frontier remission; outlying hamlets in thinly populated tracts, whether on the actual border or not, and certain peculiarly difficult areas in proximity to important roads, but at a distance from the nearest village, such as the Pezu Pass on the main road from Bannu to Dera Ismail Khan. There are no doubt others in which the employment of levies could be defended by similar arguments. Special reasons come into play at times of general unrest, when special precautions have to be taken. In devising these, care is needed lest the temporary develop into the permanent and the permanent into the hereditary.

**36. General recommendations.**—Except in the Kohat District therefore and in the Pezu Pass, we recommend the abolition of all District Levies, a general resumption of all Government rifles and a vigorous enforcement of the Arms Act. Where District Levies are maintained we consider that Rs. 15 per mensem or some near figure is a suitable basic wage. The men may be regarded as whole time servants of Government, but to enable them to cultivate their lands a very generous leave margin should be left and not more than two-thirds of the nominal strength should ordinarily be expected to be present. Where they are retained the organisation and control of District Levies should be put in the hands of the District Officer Frontier Constabulary and the question of their being given the legal status of police constables should be examined. We understand that the military mobilisation scheme provides for the employment of temporary levies for specific purposes in various parts of the North-West Frontier Province at a wage of Rs. 30 per mensem. This figure should be reconsidered, as it seems to us that it will be possible to obtain the men required at a much lower rate.

**37. Recommendations for Kohat District.**—Our reasons for making an exception of District Levies in the Kohat District are—

- (1) the nature of the country in that District,
- (2) the general good record of Kohat Levies,
- (3) the disposition of the people and the large number of ex-soldiers among them,
- (4) the hereditary enmity between the chief tribes of the Kohat District (Khattaks and Bangash) and their trans-border neighbours.

The strength of the permanent Kohat Levies is—

Kohat District	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	161
Shia Salient	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	309

and their approximate cost per annum is Rs. 89,000. Even in the case of Kohat reduction should be made as opportunity offers of levies such as

those in Kachai and Shinawari where the existence of Frontier Constabulary Posts or other reasons would seem to make them unnecessary.

**38. Financial effect.**—The total amount of the reduction of permanent and recurring expenditure which will be effected if our recommendations are adopted is Rs. 40,000—Rs. 37,000 under levies, and Rs. 3,000 by restriction in the issue of arms. The expenditure of Rs. 2,13,000 on temporary levies should be carefully re-examined as each temporary sanction expires and on no account should these be allowed as a matter of course to become a permanent commitment.

### (E) FRONTIER CONSTABULARY.

**39. Reasons why separate Force of Frontier Constabulary necessary.**—The Frontier Constabulary is the first line of the defence organisation on the administered side of the border. Its organisation took its present form in 1913 when it replaced the Border Military Police which had become discredited. It is for this reason that it is called the Frontier and not the Border Constabulary, which would be logically more correct. The Samana Rifles, an irregular force, officered by police officers, raised after the disturbances of 1897 to guard the Samana Ridge between Kohat District and Orakzai country formed the nucleus of the new force. The justification for the existence of the Frontier Constabulary as an entity separate from the police forces of the various districts has always been that the functions of patrolling the border with the object of preventing raids and capturing raiding gangs, of maintaining border defence up to the point where the intervention of regular troops becomes necessary are essentially different from the prevention and detection of crime and the promotion of law and order in the settled districts, and that therefore specialisation of organisation, training and armament are necessary. A feature of this civil armed force, perhaps the most important feature after the specialisation of organisation and training just mentioned, is its fluidity; for normal peacetime working it is distributed over the settled districts and the district units act under the immediate orders of the Deputy Commissioners: but the force is intended to be a fluid provincial force and to be available for concentration at any threatened point. The Frontier Constabulary is officered by officers of the Indian Police under a Commandant belonging to the same service, is organized into units under District Officers, and with the exception of one unit, is located in a chain of strong posts just inside the border. The efficient and loyal performance of their duties by this corps has been an important factor in securing the comparative immunity of the settled districts from raids during the past seven or eight years.

**40. Strength and cost of Force.**—The strength, composition, organisation, distribution and duties of the Frontier Constabulary were the subject of enquiry and recommendations by the Committee on the Armed Civil Forces of the North-West Frontier Province in 1926 and considerable modifications in organisation, and reduction in strength were made as a result of that Committee's work. The force as normally organised on the basis of the Committee's recommendations is composed of 82 platoons of infantry of fifty men each and 36 sections of mounted infantry of twelve men each. Recently a temporary addition of two platoons has been made to meet the present situation, and with the various extra details the total sanctioned strength now is 4,664, and the annual cost approximately Rs. 22·5 lakhs. The Frontier Constabulary is the cheapest of the organised civil armed forces, the cost per man on the basis of the last budget figures being Rs. 502 as against corresponding figures of Rs. 540 for the police, Rs. 560 for the Kurram Militia, Rs. 650 for the North Waziristan Scouts, and Rs. 688 for the South Waziristan Scouts.

**41. Replacement of Frontier Constabulary by Levies.**—While subsequent experience and the opinions expressed by witnesses before us have served to emphasise and confirm the wisdom of the majority of the Civil Armed Forces Committee's proposals, on two important points we find ourselves compelled to formulate a contrary view. The policy as stated by the Committee contemplated (1) a gradual substitution of cheaper Levy posts



for many of the Frontier Constabulary posts along the border and (2) a final merging of the Frontier Constabulary into the District Police as an armed reserve. Our conclusions regarding levies involve, as a natural corollary, the rejection of the first policy, as the general principle of our conclusions is incompatible with the substitution, for an armed force of Government, of any system involving the arming of the population.

**42. Frontier Constabulary cannot be combined either with Scouts or with Police.**—The idea of combining the Frontier Constabulary either with other forces of irregulars like the Scouts or Militia on the one hand, or with the District Police on the other is attractive but, we consider, impracticable. Considerations of economy, and the divergence in composition and function between the Scouts and the Frontier Constabulary rule out the first alternative. With regard to the second it seems to us that the reasons for bringing into existence a separate force for defence against raiding are, in general, as valid now as they were when the Border Military Police was first raised. Different qualifications, different standards of education, different training are required for the prevention, detection, and investigation of crime, and for the defence of the border against armed raiding gangs, and the immunity from raids of the last few years cannot be regarded as supporting a conclusion that the Frontier Constabulary no longer is necessary. But we should not have been opposed to the second proposal of the Civil Armed Forces Committee as an ultimate ideal, had it not been for the fact that the recent decision of the Round Table Conference about the constitution of the North-West Frontier Province as a separate Governor's Province involving, as an expressed policy, the allocation of responsibility for internal law and order to a minister, and the reservation of the liability for border defence to the Central Government, necessarily postulates separation in the actual agencies by which these responsibilities are discharged. Any attempt at a merger would result in such financial and administrative difficulties as would cause a breakdown. We consider therefore that the Frontier Constabulary must remain as a separate force for which the Central Government will be responsible.

**43. Relations of Commandant with Inspector General of Police.**—Following from this conclusion we consider that the Commandant of the Frontier Constabulary should remain an officer directly subordinate to the Chief Commissioner and not under the Inspector General of Police, a question with regard to which the evidence has disclosed considerably varying views. The latter arrangement would be productive of administrative difficulties and possible conflict of responsibilities. The existing arrangements whereby the Inspector General of Police places officers at the disposal of the Commandant for employment as Constabulary officers should continue; difficulties pointed out by the Chief Commissioner in the selection of officers for Frontier Constabulary work would be reduced by the equalisation of the special allowances of the latter force to the level of those drawn by District Police officers; future conditions of service will probably not justify any differentiation in favour of the Frontier Constabulary Officer.

**44. Frontier Constabulary may be used as armed reserve for Police Force.**—We desire to make one qualification in these recommendations regarding the maintenance of the present separate existence of the District Police and the Frontier Constabulary. The existence of the Frontier Constabulary with its reserves at the Headquarters of Districts must be taken into account by the police administration of the Province in assessing its strength to cope with internal disorder. Failure to do so would result in unnecessary duplication of establishments. The general lines of our recommendations here, which we discussed with the Committee dealing with the proposals for increasing the police force, were that in all districts except Peshawar, where circumstances are special, the strength of the police force should be calculated on the assumption that the Frontier Constabulary is available as an armed reserve and that it could anywhere be employed as such in emergencies during internal disorder. As the trans-border element in the constabulary renders unsuitable its employment for controlling crowds, the force should be employed, with the arms to which they are accustomed, for holding perimeters, guarding strong points and for similar duties.

**45. Composition and sphere of duty.**—We do not recommend any change in the present trans-border element in the Constabulary. Nor do we recommend generally any extension of the responsibilities of the Frontier Constabulary to areas beyond the border of administered territory. While there can be no objection to entrusting trans-border posts to this corps as a temporary measure permanent assumption of trans-border responsibilities by it would lead to demands for equalisation of conditions of service with those of the Scouts which would be difficult to resist.

**46. Reductions proposed.**—As reductions have recently been made in the strength of the Frontier Constabulary in consequence of the recommendations of the Civil Armed Forces Committee there is now little scope for further retrenchment. At the same time it is clear that the large expenditure of money on the control of Waziristan must fail in its purpose if it does not lead to some economy in cis-border defence: and as, in fact, there has been a comparative cessation of raiding along the borders of Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan Districts, abandonment of posts and reduction of strength in these districts is possible. We consider that apart from the reduction of the two temporary platoons which will be made when conditions return to normal it should be possible then to achieve further economies of six platoons of infantry and five sections of mounted infantry, or of 360 men with the corresponding number of Indian officers. The statement which will be found in Appendix IV indicates how we have arrived at this figure. The strength of the corps will after these reductions be 76 platoons of infantry and 31 sections of mounted infantry, or 4,172 men with the necessary complement of officers. It is realised that this reduction is not immediately possible. We desire to emphasise again the fluid character of this force, to urge that its strength in the various areas should not be considered as fixed, but should be varied to meet conditions, seasonal, temporary, or permanent. The strength that has been recommended has not been calculated to meet any new responsibilities which may be assumed by the Frontier Constabulary, *e.g.*, the taking over of Manzai elsewhere recommended in this report, or the possible garrisoning of the Samana ridge. For such additional charges special increases in strength will have to be sanctioned. The suggested strength does however take into account probable dispositions on the Khajuri and Aka Khel Plains.

**47. Further recommendations.**—The savings which will accrue if our proposals be accepted amount to Rs. 1,42,000 approximately. We consider however that from these savings the cost of three further recommendations should be met. The cost of these will be Rs. 76,000, and the net saving consequent on our proposals Rs. 66,000.

(a) All witnesses with special knowledge of the Frontier Constabulary have commented on the success of the reservist scheme adopted on the recommendation of the 1926 Committee. At present three hundred reservists come up for training who have seen service in regular or irregular forces. The scheme at present suffers from the handicap that the money to pay for it has to be found from savings in the ordinary budget grant. The reductions we suggest, if carried out, will tend to impair the power of the Corps to meet emergencies, and it will be essential for it to have a reserve to facilitate rapid expansion. We suggest that a permanent provision of Rs. 30,000 per annum be made to permit of an increase in the reserve and to place the arrangements on a stable basis. This will enable an increase in the number to between 400 and 500 to be made. This reserve will be available in times of trouble not only to Frontier Constabulary but also as a reservoir from which other civil armed forces can draw.

(b) A strong case was made out before us for the grant of a special local allowance of Rs. 3 per month to members of the force serving in the Tank and Drazinda areas. We consider that the unpopularity of service in these areas is having an adverse effect on recruitment which is already difficult owing to the less favourable rates of pay and conditions of service of this force as compared with those of the Scouts, and to some extent of the police. We recommend that this local allowance be sanctioned, and consider that the cost of the concession will probably not exceed Rs. 40,000 per annum.

(c) We believe that the payment of a bonus of Rs. 100 to all men who serve continuously for six years will increase the attractions of recruitment in the Frontier Constabulary, and induce trained men to extend the period for which they first sign on, which is three years. The average number who retire at the end of three years service is two hundred, and if seventy-five per cent. of these stayed on, the gross extra cost would be Rs. 15,000. Since however the extension of the period of service of a trained man results in the saving of Rs. 60 which would be spent on the equipment of a recruit, the net extra cost would be Rs. 6,000 only. This sum would be further reduced owing to the fact that of the men that have the opportunity of taking their discharge after six years of service many have received promotion, or are for other reasons reluctant to leave the force, and expenditure on the equipment of recruits again is saved. Thus at little extra cost an improvement can be effected in the conditions of service which will operate to attract recruits to this, the cheapest of the armed forces, which it is now becoming increasingly difficult to obtain, and at the same time, the scheme, in so far as it induces the substitution of trained men for recruits, secures much better value for money in efficient service, and tends to the reduction of overhead charges.

**48. Co-ordination with other forces.**—We consider that the present arrangements for the co-ordination of the work of the Frontier Constabulary with that of the other forces, including regular troops, are generally satisfactory, and no important change is necessary. Instances were quoted which displayed a lack of co-ordination in the intelligence organisation, but this complaint was not a general one. Better liaison can easily be secured as far as this corps is concerned, without multiplying the existing agencies, by removing the cause of fault when any breakdown has been found to occur. But the permanent establishment of a Central Intelligence Bureau which we suggest elsewhere will operate to remove any failure of liaison in the case of this force.

#### (F) SCOUTS AND MILITIAS.

**49. General description.**—Scouts and Militias are the most highly organised and trained of the various corps which compose the armed civil forces. Their officer personnel is found from the regular army from which officers are seconded for a period of years for service with these corps.

**50. Role.**—We accept generally the definition of the primary duties of Scouts and Militias given by the Armed Civil Forces Committee of 1926. These are :—

- (a) to maintain political control within the Agencies,
- (b) to prevent raiding,
- (c) to safeguard communications,
- (d) to deal with tribal disturbances or acts of external aggression alone or in conjunction with the Army—and, we may now add, the Royal Air Force.

**51.** It will be seen that the duties entail a considerable measure of dispersion particularly in the more purely political functions of these irregular corps. Ability to patrol freely is of the essence of Scout duties and it is by this means that raiding can be prevented, political control exercised and the range and extent of what has been described as their 'mission work' gradually extended. For the tasks of a more military nature concentration is desirable and in deciding upon the distribution of the various units these somewhat conflicting desiderata must be balanced.

**52. Policy regarding posts.**—As a general principle we endorse the views of the Armed Civil Forces Committee that the number of posts should be kept as low as possible and confined to points of obvious strategic or local importance. In this connection a policy of seasonal distribution can be usefully applied in some cases, and we have made certain specific recommendations on those lines. It should be axiomatic that a post in order to justify its existence must be of sufficient size to enable its garrison to provide patrols or small mobile columns and that the post itself should require the minimum number



of men for its defence. Small posts are liable to be a cause of anxiety in time of disturbance and may embarrass the Commander's plan of action by necessitating early relief. In deciding upon the site for posts the importance of a landing ground in close proximity should be borne in mind. Wherever possible the locality selected should be capable of meeting this requirement.

**53. Protection of communications.**—Scouts are naturally averse from being looked upon as line of communication troops and the allocation of such a role in its strict interpretation would be to make very indifferent use of the most valuable qualities of the Scouts and demand a task which would be beyond their capabilities. The static duties of road protection should be left to Khassadars, and the fact realized that in times of serious unrest neither Khassadars nor Scouts can keep open communications. Scouts' posts, however, are necessarily located on roads and it is from these posts that they carry out their proper functions, though incidentally their presence helps materially towards keeping the roads safe and open under normal conditions.

**54. Defence of Posts.**—It must be recognised that when serious trouble arises Scouts in hostile country will lose their freedom of movement and they will be confined wholly or partially to their posts. Given adequate supplies of food, water and ammunition they should be able to hold out for a prolonged period but some form of support must be forthcoming. In certain cases the Royal Air Force will be able to provide this support by action against the actual attackers and, more effectively, by bombing their villages, so rendering relief by ground forces unnecessary. In any case the Royal Air Force should be able to prolong the time before relief becomes necessary by raising the morale of the defenders and ensuring the replenishment of rations and ammunition. Further, given favourable circumstances, the Royal Air Force may be able to bring assistance in the shape of air-borne reinforcements either regulars or irregulars, and this is a factor of great importance. The Scouts and Militias have now reached a high standard of training and discipline and we have no reason to question their loyalty even under strain. The fact, however, remains that the personnel are all Mussalman and in most cases—in Waziristan in all cases—all Pathan and in times of racial or religious excitement the danger from within cannot be ignored. The air should certainly help to mitigate this danger, but we do not consider that the principle of having regular troops within reasonable supporting distance can be abandoned. Assuming prolonged hostilities it will in any case be necessary sooner or later to reopen communication by ground action.

**55. Equipment.**—In order to increase the defensive power of posts and for moral effect we are in favour of post guns being allotted to the larger and more important garrisons, and there is a general demand for this measure. The provision of wireless telegraphy is also most important.

When Scouts have been concentrated in the larger posts we consider that they will have to be provided with some additional mechanical transport so as to enable parties to be transported rapidly to the areas in which patrolling and the interception of raiders may be required.

**56. Further than these recommendations** we do not consider that any measures are required that will add to the impediments and equipment of irregular corps. The principal asset of these corps lies in their mobility and anything likely to reduce this and tending to 'regularise' the Scout is to be strongly resisted. We are, however, impressed with the value to be obtained by using Scouts in co-operation with regulars, when the combination of the mobility of the Scouts, and the fire power of the regulars can be employed with the greatest effect.

**57. Composition.**—The question of class composition is one of great importance in irregular corps. Only the Chitral Scouts and Kurram Militia are militias in the true sense of the term in that they are both locally recruited, with the exception of a small extraneous element of Mahsuds in the latter. In the other corps the present policy is to limit the trans-border recruitment to one-third, the remaining two-thirds being enlisted from the Pathan tribes within the administrative border. We

do not suggest any change in this policy, which has proved satisfactory, and any marked increase in the trans-border proportion would, we believe, affect reliability.

58. **Recruitment.**—Even at their present strength the irregular corps—and in this connection we must include the Frontier Constabulary—are experiencing some difficulty in finding the necessary quota of cis-border recruits, and this applies particularly to the Khattaks who form the backbone of their Pathan recruitment. It has been suggested to us that some reduction in the height and chest measurement of recruits might be accepted in the Scouts and Constabulary, and we believe that this could be done without detriment to the high physical standard which it is so essential for these corps to maintain in view of the exacting nature of their duties. There also appear to be some suitable cis-border tribes, such as Niazi and the Awan Bangash, which have not yet been tapped.

59. If any considerable number of Scouts has to be raised at any time it might be found necessary to restrict Khattak enlistment in the regular army but this is a step we should regret to see taken. An alternative would be to widen the field of recruitment by enlisting Punjab Mussalmans. There is no serious objection to such a course, which in fact might introduce a stabilising element in purely Pathan units, but the Punjabi would suffer some disability owing to his ignorance of the language, country and customs of the people, which will extend the period before the recruit can fully pull his weight. We therefore do not recommend this course unless Pathan recruitment fails to maintain the necessary numbers.

60. The pros and cons mentioned with regard to the Punjabi Mussalman would apply with greater force to the enlistment of Hindu classes. Also it would involve many administrative complications and for the present we do not think the idea worth pursuing.

61. **Local enlistment.**—There remains the question of local enlistment which presents difficulties only in the case of the Waziristan Scouts and the Zhob Militia. Local enlistment in Waziristan is confined to two platoons of Wazirs in the Tochi Scouts, and even to this extent has not proved very satisfactory up to date, as the Wazir does not come forward readily for enlistment and Daur recruitment has failed. This difficulty, which we believe to be peculiar to the Wazir and Daur, would seem to preclude any immediate extension of local enlistment in the Tochi, though in time conditions may change.

62. However, we consider that a small and carefully selected element of local enlistment should be aimed at as a general principle. Without it the Scouts remain a foreign force which is no way identified with the people among whom they are serving. Touch with the inhabitants and co-operation with the Khassadars is necessarily less intimate, and the civilising effect of the "mission work" of the Scouts more difficult to achieve. We have, however, been assured by those most competent to judge that, though near, the time is not yet when Mahsuds can be enlisted in the South Waziristan Militia. The many advantages which would accrue in peaceful times would be too dearly bought if, in pursuit of the ideal, reliability were to suffer in times of stress. We therefore confine ourselves to an indication of the principle, trusting that its realisation may be something more than a pious hope.

#### (G) ARMED CIVIL FORCES IN BALUCHISTAN.

63. **Origin and development.**—The essential means through which Sandeman enforced his policy of tribal responsibility in Baluchistan was the tribal levy, and the armed civil forces in Baluchistan are largely a development of the system which he first fully employed. The levy system as initiated by Sandeman provided for the grant of allowances to headmen of tribes for maintaining a number of armed men through whom order was to be maintained and offenders produced when required. The assumptions of the system were that headmen existed through whom responsibility could be enforced, if support were forthcoming, and that no tribesman could be expected to work for Government unless paid for it. It is impossible to follow the history of

the levy system through its various stages to show the development of the present position. The armed civil forces of Baluchistan as they now exist may be divided into three classes according to their stages of organisation, this organisation having resulted from a diverging development of function. In the first class, by itself, is the most highly organised corps of the Zhob Militia, in the second, the less organised Mekran and Chagai Levy Corps, and in the third a number of loosely organised bodies of tribesmen, variously termed District Levies, Auxiliaries, or Scouts.

**64. Zhob Militia.**—The Zhob Militia is a body of highly trained irregulars which forms the first line of defence in the Zhob Valley, on the frontier between Afghanistan and Baluchistan, and on the border between Waziristan and Baluchistan. It holds a line of posts from Loeband to Manikhwā, and its duties are the normal peace time duties of a civil armed force, to maintain control over the tribes, preserve internal order, and prevent raiding from outside. Although termed a militia, the force is in no sense a militia in the accepted use of the word, for a large part of its composition is Pathan from tribes of the North-West Frontier Province, and the Baluchistan tribes from whom the remaining part is recruited are not the tribes inhabiting the Zhob Valley. Its strength is 1,364 men; it is officered by 6 British Officers seconded from their regular units, and costs approximately Rs. 10 lakhs per annum. Its more developed organisation and equipment are due to the fact that it has to deal with the incursions of the powerful Suleiman Khel from Afghanistan, with the menace of the Ahmadzai Wazirs from the direction of Waziristan, and with the Shirani tribe which lies between Baluchistan and Dera Ismail Khan.

**65. Recommendations.**—There are three recommendations which we consider it necessary to make in connection with this force—

- (a) We understand that the Brahui Company has never been regarded as an entirely satisfactory element in the force, and recommend that, if political conditions in Waziristan permit of the change, Mahsuds might be substituted for Brahuis. This measure would assist the development of the Waziristan policy, and although for administrative reasons Orakzai or Afridis would be preferred to Mahsuds the latter would be a not unacceptable element in the corps.
- (b) It was suggested that an addition of 400 men should be made in order to garrison posts which would facilitate the re-establishment of control in Kakar Khorassan. The proposals however involved several unsatisfactory features, the most doubtful of which was the admitted necessity of withdrawal in case of incursion in force from the other side of the frontier. We examined the Agent to the Governor General in Baluchistan at some length on this subject, and find that he concurs in our view that the establishment of control in this area should be carried out through existing agencies, though some redistribution of levies might be necessary to achieve the purpose.
- (c) We understand that proposals to construct a post at Gul Kach have recently been negatived by the Government of India. We suggest that this decision be reconsidered. The construction of a post at Gul Kach is essential, if full use is to be made of the road connecting the Zhob Valley with Tanai the construction of which is already far advanced. The garrisoning of this post will involve no addition to the Zhob Militia as when it is ready it is proposed to reduce the posts of Mir Ali Khel and Moghal Kot, both of which are unsatisfactory and unhealthy and these will then be made over to levies. The money for the construction of the Gul Kach post should, in our view, be found as early as possible.

**66. Mekran and Chagai Levy Corps.**—The Civil Armed Forces falling under the second category are the Mekran and the Chagai Levy Corps. The first has an approximate strength of 540 men including temporary additions,

costs roughly Rs. 5·4 lakhs per year, and has a British Officer as Adjutant under the Assistant Political Agent, who is *ex-officio* Commandant. The Chagai Levy Corps has an approximate strength of 340 men, costs about Rs. 1·8 lakhs and is looked after by an Indian Adjutant supervised by the Political Agent. These corps control the Mekran and Chagai portions of the frontier respectively and in view of the great length of frontier they have to cover no reduction in numbers and cost can be proposed. The Agent to the Governor General and the local Political Agents have urged that temporary increases which have been sanctioned should be made permanent. We do not recommend that any permanent increases should be made until the results of the full enquiry into the Baluchistan levies which we propose below are known. It may be necessary to increase the strength of both these Corps, but we incline to the view that alterations in strength should be made largely by way of redistribution, increases here found by reductions in tribal levies, and that ultimately little if any extra cost should be necessary.

**67. District and other Levies.**—The third class is composed, as already indicated, of a miscellaneous assortment of levies, known by different designations, employed under different conditions and rates of pay, but all, generally speaking, expected to perform the same functions. The following are the most important of these levies :—

Name.	Strength.	Cost. Rs.
Zhob Scouts . . . . .	318	66,180
Zhob Auxiliaries . . . . .	87	36,924
Zhob District Levies . . . . .	350	1,32,000
Loralai (Musakhel) Scouts . . . . .	35	9,960
Loralai District Levies . . . . .	390	1,61,568
Quetta-Pishin District Levies . . . . .	458	1,58,628
Sibi District Levies . . . . .	628	2,81,256
Chagai Scouts . . . . .	108	31,272
Chagai District Levies . . . . .	188	94,200
Kalat District Levies . . . . .	361	1,18,284
Temporary Kalat Tribal Contingents . . . . .	105	29,225
Total . . . . .	3,026	11,19,497

There is in addition a force of 200 temporary police in Quetta Pishin costing Rs. 80,000 per annum.

This list does not claim to be exhaustive, but even so mounts up to a formidable total.

**68. Need for enquiry into levy system.** These levies are controlled by the District Officers, and discharge multifarious duties; they carry out the detection and arrest of offenders, guard communications, bring in witnesses, produce supplies, escort prisoners, and assist in the collection of evidence. In some cases the levies find their own weapons, in others they are provided with arms by Government. Portions of the sums mentioned above are in some cases paid to the headmen of the tribes in accordance with the Sandeman policy. These levies are indeed the concrete embodiment of the Sandeman policy, but we are not convinced that in all cases their continued existence, or their use, would be found, on investigation, to be in strict accord with the principles for which Sandeman himself was responsible. We are inclined to doubt whether at a surprise inspection the strength of these levies would be quite what it is shown to be on the pay roll, and we are not certain that such check and control are exercised as will ensure that Government gets fair value for the money spent. We are glad to know that the Agent to the Governor General has already taken up this question and directed that an enquiry into the whole question of these district levies should be made by each Political Agent. This enquiry is clearly necessary, and it might be

advisable to entrust it to one experienced officer whose interests are not local, and who would be able better to review the whole position, propose redistribution and possible reductions. It is impossible to prognosticate whether reductions in cost will or will not be possible, but we venture to offer the view that no increase need be necessary, and that additions demanded for the Mekran and Chagai Levy Corps and elsewhere should be found from savings. In any scheme of re-organisation we should like to see the formal acceptance and extension in the Zhob Valley of the system already tentatively adopted whereby British Militia officers exercise some degree of supervision and control over levies. The principles which should be applied in any scheme of re-organisation are those which, we maintain, must be enforced in connection with any scheme of employment of tribesmen, namely (1) that no tribesman should be employed except for definite duties, the performance of which can be verified and (2), no tribesman should be employed in any place which cannot be visited and inspected by a British Officer.

### PART III.

#### (A) EMERGENCY CONTROL, DEFENCE, AND THE ARMY OF THE CROWN.

**69. Normal and emergency control.**—The forces which we have been considering are civil forces, whose normal functions may be falling within the general definition of police work. Occasions have frequently arisen in the past when normal methods of political control, enforced only by such means as the civil forces can supply, have broken down in one or other part of the frontier region. Loss of control carries with it peculiar dangers in this area and it has therefore become a recognised postulate that military support to the policeman, or, as we prefer to call him, the irregular, must always be within reach. It is at this stage that the problem of normal control, which devolves upon the political authorities, passes into the problem of emergency control and defence, for which the armed forces of the Crown are responsible.

**70. Nature of Defence problem.**—The defence of the North-West Frontier of India is indeed the most important military responsibility with which the British Empire is faced, and, although tribal defence is only part of the problem, which includes security against Afghanistan and preparedness to meet Russian aggression, whether direct or indirect, the tribal factor is the one with which India is in closest contact and with which our enquiry is primarily concerned.

**71.** The topographical and ethnographic conditions of the frontier are too familiar to require any detailed description in this report and have already been touched on in Part I. But to illustrate the magnitude of our immediate problem we quote from the evidence of the Chief Commissioner, who warned us against attempting too much in the way of immediate reduction. "The population of the tribal area", he said, "has been estimated at  $2\frac{1}{2}$  million, which gives a fighting strength of about half a million. Even if we halve this, there remains a very formidable force of 250,000 men, natural fighters and very well armed. If they were able to co-ordinate their movements to a single end we should find it very difficult to maintain ourselves across the Indus. Any State in Europe with such fighting potentialities as the tribal territory possesses would be regarded as a very formidable neighbour by any other European State". Although organisation is lacking and concerted hostile action has never been achieved in the past, these mitigating factors are to a considerable extent counterbalanced by the volatile nature of the tribes and the predatory instincts for which, from time immemorial they have been noted.

**72. Role of Covering Troops.**—The Army in India is for purposes of organisation and plans for war divided into the Field Army, Covering Troops and Internal Security units. It is on the Covering Troops that the task of the immediate defence of the border falls. The role of these troops is three-fold :—

- (a) to protect the administered districts from tribal incursions :
- (b) to act from their location either within or without tribal territory as a steady influence and to deal with local unrest or disturbances :
- (c) to form a screen behind which the Field Army can concentrate according to pre-concerted plans.

**73. Categories not rigid.**—It must, however, be realised that although specific roles are allotted to each of the three categories into which the Army in India is divided they can in no way be looked upon as water-tight compartments. Availability of all resources to meet the most pressing need of the moment is a principle of military organisation and freedom of interchange between categories must therefore be retained. During operations it might well occur that portions of the Field Army might be deflected to co-operate



with Covering Troops in dealing with a serious tribal menace, or that Covering Troops might be employed across the Durand Line to supplement the operations of the Field Army. Similarly Covering or Field Army Troops might find themselves used for what are properly speaking Internal Security duties, as actually occurred in Peshawar District in 1930.

**74. Defence problem to be viewed as a whole.**—It is therefore not possible to take an entirely detached view of the functions and strength of the Covering Troops without bearing in mind their relation to the rest of the Army in India. Indeed it is necessary to go further. To comply with our terms of reference all the means of tribal control and defence must be considered together and in judging the ability of India to meet the insistent needs of the situation regard must be paid not only to the strength, but also to the disposition, organisation, co-ordination and mutual relations of all the armed forces—troops, Royal Air Force and irregulars—maintained or available for the purpose.

**75. Effect of constitutional changes.**—The task of reviewing requirements for border defence is in many ways rendered more difficult at the present juncture when there are in process of development great constitutional changes which may have important repercussions upon the military framework in India and upon our relations with the frontier tribes and Afghanistan. However, taking the frontier situation as it exists to-day, we have endeavoured, according to our terms of reference, to determine what modifications might be made with a reasonable degree of security, bearing in mind that, while India's new constitution is in a state of evolution, it is of special importance to ensure that orderly and steady progress should not be embarrassed or threatened by complications on or beyond the border.

**76. Lessons of 1930.**—We have also to consider most carefully the experiences of 1930. The factor which complicated the situation was the disturbed state of the districts, especially Peshawar and Bannu, and the belief that the downfall of British rule and consequent withdrawal from places such as Waziristan were at hand. In the re-actions of the internal situation upon the tribes there are certain points of similarity between 1930 and the period immediately preceding and influencing the outbreak of the Third Afghan War in 1919. In this respect 1930 went beyond 1919, but other potent factors were lacking and its occurrences were in many other ways peculiar. Tribal unrest for once received no instigation from Kabul. In fact King Nadir did his best to discourage hostile action by the tribes of both his and our territory. Also there was no religious spur to the tribal risings. These factors led to a lack of cohesion in tribal action. It would therefore in our opinion be unwise to venture upon conclusions based solely on the events of this year. Although no major tribal rising did in fact develop, the symptoms of unrest were very prominent and appeared on a wide front. But originating as they did, the outbreaks were sporadic and being promptly dealt with from the air as they occurred were prevented from assuming the more serious proportions to which they otherwise might, and indeed probably would, have attained. Even as things were, the combination of internal unrest and tribal ebullitions led to considerable re-inforcement of the Covering Troops and the employment of six—and in the latter stages seven—out of the eight Royal Air Force squadrons in India.

**77. Value of the air weapon and its limitations.**—The value of air power was thus clearly demonstrated. It has placed in the hands of Government an offensive weapon of the greatest importance which can be readily used even against the most inaccessible tribe. As a deterrent against the occurrence of trouble and to check its spread, this weapon, used by itself, has already given proof of its powers. It has also shown what it can do in causing the withdrawal of the investing force from a beleagured post by action against the villages from which the lashkar came, as at Datta Khel, and by keeping up the morale of the garrison. But this does not exhaust the list of its uses. Even in its present stage of development, when it is employed in co-operation with troops, it is a factor which should make for economy of man-power, and it can be used to extend the circuit of action of columns by reducing dependence on mule transport which is very vulnerable and tends so greatly to

restrict mobility. There are of course certain obvious limitations to what the air weapon can do, as there are to the capabilities of troops or any other forms of force; nor is it to be supposed that the tribesman will not evolve new tactics to counter the new weapon. But when, with the development of air transport, as we foresee, posts can be re-inforced and supplied, and columns supported from the air, and dependence on lines of communication and transport reduced at need to a minimum, we anticipate that realisation of his own weakness and limitations will be borne in upon him. We expect this to re-act in a variety of ways, but generally to conduce towards the creation of conditions in which the policy of peaceful penetration can be pursued with less apprehension on the part of Government as to possible repercussions, military and financial. To sum up, we deduct from the operations of 1930 that it was the air weapon on which reliance was, and in similar circumstances is again likely to be, in the first instance placed for dealing with trouble in its initial stages; that in the situation then existing it was of first importance in checking the spread of trouble; and for purposes of defence, apart from co-operation with the army and direct action against an attacking lashkar, it must rely mainly upon the offensive by taking action against the lashkar's concentration area or the villages from which it has come. In the latter event action may be restricted on account of political considerations. Finally it must not in all cases be assumed that it is necessarily cheaper to deal with trouble by air action than by the use of ground forces.

**78. Necessity for the presence of troops.**—What we have said above about combination between troops and air makes it clear that we cannot urge any immediate considerable reduction of the ground forces now located on or beyond the border. Troops will certainly on occasion be acquired for offensive action and there is no doubt whatever of the stabilising effect of their physical presence. A single battalion in many locations such as there are on the frontier may prove in times of excitement of greater value than a force of many times its strength located at a distance. Thus from the nature of the country and the psychology of its inhabitants a considerable degree of dispersion is inevitable on the frontier. Convinced therefore as we are that the presence of troops is vital to the maintenance of security we are constrained to exercise caution in our recommendations for present reduction. It is to the improvement of communications—by road, rail and air—that we must look for greater flexibility and greater economy of force. This therefore is a principle which we have endeavoured to develop in our recommendations.

**79. Extended use of air power.**—We realise that an increase in the Royal Air Force and the extended use of air power will be considered by Government to be justified only if counterbalanced by reductions in other military forces, and leading to further substantial economies; but it is beyond the scope of our Committee to say how and where the savings other than in Covering Troops are to be found. These are points which must be left to the military authorities to decide. But we do consider that some extension in the use of air power is possible and desirable, and that further economies should result therefrom. It was represented to us, for example, that the old fashioned punitive expedition should in future rarely, if ever, recur and that in any case it would require proportionately fewer troops than hitherto. The second proposition, we think, admits of no dispute, and we are prepared to accept the first as much in the light of constitutional changes as for reasons connected with the development of air power. But the only indication which we can properly give of possible savings is that with the extended use of air power it will be found that the more distant objectives of a trans-border campaign may be left to air action, and that, if we may for a moment look beyond the sphere of tribal control and defence, in the event of war with Afghanistan, a less extensive advance may be assigned to the army on the northern line. This should enable reductions to be made in those formations of the Field Army which are only mobilised and brought into action in the later stages of operations.

**80. Heavy Transport Squadrons.**—We understand that partly on grounds of internal security, the Government of India have already accepted in principle an addition to the Royal Air Force in India of one Heavy Transport



Squadron, and in outlining our Waziristan\* programme we have assumed that orders in pursuance of this decision will have been issued during the financial year 1931-32, and that consequently this squadron will have come into being in 1933-34. We believe that the provision of a second similar squadron will be justified on general considerations of defence as well as in virtue of the extensive economies to which we think that it will open the way. Our Waziristan programme is not in any way conditional on the provision of this second squadron, but we are of opinion that this provision should be made when funds can be made available.

## (B) DIRECTION AND CONTROL OF AIR OPERATIONS.

**81. Difficulties of the Subject.**—Under head (3) of our terms of reference we were required to examine and consider whether any departure from existing arrangements in respect of the co-ordination and mutual relations of the different forces maintained on the frontier is advisable. So far as the Civil Armed Forces are concerned our suggestions will be found in the relevant portions of our report. There remains the question of the direction and control of air operations which we have had under careful review.

**82.** The subject is clearly a difficult one owing to the constitutional position of the army and the Royal Air Force as two separate services. On the one hand it is contended that the separate chain of command promotes rapidity of action on which the advocates of the air weapon lay so much stress. On the other the existence side by side of two distinct military forces, functioning at times independently each in its own sphere, and in a very different manner, though united by a common purpose, may give rise to divergence of views and dissipation of effort, especially when in times of disturbance the political authorities may have to look to two separate commanders for expert advice. These factors are however inherent in the position.

**83. Effect of the existing rules**—On the occurrence of a tribal emergency involving the intervention of the Royal Air Force direction of their operations may under the existing rules be exercised in one of three ways :—

- (a) If troops are engaged, such air force assistance as may be required is detailed to co-operate with them under the orders of the military commander and all air operations carried out within the radius of action of the troops are directed by him ;
- (b) More distant air operations outside the range of troops are carried out by the air force under the direction of the chief political authority (*e.g.*, the Chief Commissioner or the Resident in Waziristan) who, as the centre of all political information, is best placed to judge the varying tribal situation and to gauge the political reactions and repercussions which the employment of force involves ;
- (c) In more serious situations necessitating the transfer of political control to the military the direction of all air operations, whether within range of troops or at a distance, also passes to the military commander.

**84. Air operations under political control.**—In an area such as the North West Frontier conditions are peculiarly unstable. Transition from peace to war is sudden and the dividing line slender. It is therefore most important that a weapon so well suited as the air force for the prompt suppression of incipient trouble should be under the immediate direction of the political authorities and in the closest touch with political sources of intelligence. In this way full effect and economy of force due to its rapidity of action can be fully exploited. The existing system meets these requirements, but there is always the danger that unless the closest touch is maintained between the political, military and air authorities concerned, effort may not be properly co-ordinated. This danger may increase, if the situation develops in such a way as either to bring the air operations within the proximity of troops, or towards the stage at which the

\*See Part IV, ¶ paragraph 138.

assumption of political control by the military supervenes. In this connection we consider that whenever air action is contemplated, the chief political authority requesting the sanction of the Government of India should consult the military and air commanders before doing so. We also suggest that a senior staff officer delegated by the command concerned as well as an air staff officer should be attached to the chief political authority until the operations are concluded. This we think will suffice to maintain co-ordination in operations under political control.

**85. Transfer of political and air control to the military.**—In the event of a more serious situation developing or appearing likely to develop to such a degree as to necessitate the transfer of local or general political control to the military and combined operations by ground and air forces, unity of command is essential. In this case the local commander, when the trouble is confined to one district, or the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Command in the case of operations extending to two or more districts, will command all air forces required for the operations. When the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief assumes command it appears essential that the Northern Command should establish an advanced headquarters at Peshawar. These remarks have reference primarily to the North-West Frontier Province, but in the event of air operations taking place in Baluchistan the same principles would apply.

**86. Possible appointment of a G. O. C. Covering Troops.**—In this connection we have carefully considered whether any advantage would be derived by the appointment of a General Officer Commanding the Covering Troops. This would entail the additional expense of an officer of high rank with a separate staff, and on the whole we consider that such a system would only add a fifth wheel to the coach.

**87. Events of 1930.**—During the summer of 1930 the situation was complicated owing to the fact that although disturbances were occurring over a wide area a state of war was never actually reached. As a result the Chief Commissioner had to assume the responsibility of controlling varying operations, both army and air force, in several areas; a task which with no adequate staff must have imposed a great strain upon his time and energies. That he was able to cope successfully with this additional responsibility is, we consider, a great tribute to him and to the co-operation he must have received from all concerned.

**88. Effect of our proposals.**—If the procedure which we have recommended above is put into force the Chief Commissioner will have the assistance when required of a senior staff officer delegated by the Northern Command and an air staff officer. This should not only greatly facilitate his task, but would possess the added advantages that all three services, political, military and air would be from the outset in the closest touch with each other and with the situation, and the machinery would be in being for the transition of political control to the military authorities with the minimum of dislocation.

**89. General powers of the Government of India.**—As all operations are undertaken with the sanction and under the general direction of the Government of India it rests with the Government of India to decide according to the nature of the operations when political control should pass to the military.

**90. Re-examination of existing orders.**—Finally we suggest that the existing orders of the Government of India for the conduct of air operations on the frontier should be re-examined in the light of these remarks.

### (C) TRIBAL FEELING WITH REGARD TO AIR ACTION.

**91. Resentment against air action and safeguards.**—We tried to elicit opinions based on first hand knowledge on the important question whether the employment of air power against villages causes greater resentment than the use of other kinds of force. Of satisfactory evidence based on personal knowledge there was little, and opinions were coloured largely by preconceived ideas. Such evidence as could be relied upon, including evidence of Pathan and Indian witnesses, whose opportunities of personal contact with

tribesmen is presumably greater, leads us to make the statement that it has not been proved that air action does cause greater resentment than the use of other kinds of force. Experience has shown that, if due warning is given, air action against villages ordinarily causes very insignificant loss of life and depends for its success mainly on the interruption of the normal and consequent discomfort and distress. While therefore we cannot seek to justify wholesale and indiscriminate bombing of villages and feel that the employment of air power against villages must always be sparingly used, with full sense of the obligations of humanity and the repercussions which injudicious use of the power may cause both inside India, and in international relations, we are convinced that selective bombing, after due warning, against villages which are definitely implicated in hostile action against Government, is a legitimate and effective method of employing air power. The present safeguards adopted in the exercise of this power are generally sufficient; and except against villages which are actually occupied by a hostile lashkar they should always be scrupulously observed. We suggest that a distinction might be made between warning and notice, the former being the announcement of a threat that further misbehaviour will be followed by air action, and the latter an unconditional statement that bombing will follow after 24 hours, a statement which should invariably be followed by action unless submission has in the meantime been made.

#### (D) POSSIBLE REDUCTIONS IN COVERING TROOPS (OTHER THAN WAZIRISTAN).

92. We now proceed to examine the various areas and districts of the frontier in detail, to see what redistributions and reductions are possible in the light of the existing situation.

##### CHITRAL.

93. **General considerations.**—Chitral is included in the military district of Peshawar but its defence and political problems are peculiar to itself. The small detachment of regular troops maintained there consists of one battalion, one section mountain artillery, one section Sappers and Miners and the minimum quota of ancillary services—medical, supply and transport, etc.—essential for local peace time requirements. As a military commitment this small isolated detachment is in many ways embarrassing and its maintenance expensive, the additional cost owing to its location, apart from the cost of the reliefs, being approximately Rs. 1,64,000 per annum. Drosh, the headquarters of the garrison, is 124 miles distant from the Malakand which is the nearest garrison on the Indian side and 253 miles from Gilgit where a garrison of Kashmir State troops is located. On both lines the communications are fit for pack transport only and have to cross high passes which are closed for several months in the winter.

A detachment of this size would of course be quite impossible were it in any way a force of occupation. Actually, however, it is welcomed by the Ruler of Chitral who not only derives considerable financial advantage from its presence, but also feels his position *vis à vis* his own people and Afghanistan more secure with this support behind him.

The inherent unsoundness of this isolated garrison from the purely strategic aspect has been considered up to date to have been justified by the political advantages of its retention. Chitral from its geographical position is exposed politically to disturbing influences from Russian Central Asia and from Badakhshan, though the risk of hostile incursions on any scale are largely discounted by the great natural difficulties of its frontiers. The presence there of regular troops as a moral backing to the Mehtar and people of Chitral influences the position far beyond their actual numbers, and as an outward and visible sign of Government power extends to Dir, Bajaur and Swat.

94. **Influence of the Royal Air Force on the position.**—With air power, and particularly with the possession of one or more Heavy Transport Squadrons the military objections to the retention of a small garrison beyond reach of immediate relief or reinforcement are considerably reduced. But on the

other hand with the asset of air transport it should be possible in emergency to send up a small body of troops, if such are required to steady the situation, though for a period of about two months during the winter air transport might not be possible, owing to weather conditions.

On the whole we are inclined to think that air developments tend to make the withdrawal of the garrison more feasible and we recommend that this policy should be accepted, and in this we have the concurrence of the Chief Commissioner.

**95. Chitral Scouts.**—A necessary preliminary will be the reorganisation of the Chitral Scouts. As at present constituted these consist of 2 British Officers and 989 Scouts. There is also a small force of 110 Chitral Levies who are distinct from the Scouts. If politically and administratively feasible it would appear desirable to absorb the Levies into the Scouts. The Scouts are all local men and are in every respect a militia being called up for one month's training a year. The results of so short a training period have been proved unsatisfactory and the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, has recommended that the period should be extended to three months per annum at an additional annual cost of Rs. 1½ lakhs. This recommendation has been made to the Government of India apart from any question of the withdrawal of regulars. Were the regular garrison to remain, the Committee would suggest the extension of the period of training to two months only, but if regulars are to be withdrawn we consider that three months' training will be essential, and it may be necessary for a small proportion of the Scouts, such as the headquarter company, to be permanently embodied. We also consider that two mountain guns should be retained in Chitral, either manned by the Scouts or kept in their custody, for use by a detachment of artillery personnel sent up from India should necessity arise.

**96. Bodyguard.**—In addition to the Scouts, there is a local force, called the Bodyguard, maintained by the Mehtar. With no regular garrison it is possible that the Mehtar will press for some addition to his allowances to enable him to make some increase in his bodyguard, but points such as this will have to be considered by the political authorities if and when they are raised by the Mehtar.

**97. Recommendations.**—Summarised our recommendations with regard to Chitral are :—

- (i) that the withdrawal of the regular garrison should be accepted as the policy ;
- (ii) that before such withdrawal takes place the efficiency of the Scouts must be raised and that the first step towards this should be an extension of the period of training to three months ;
- (iii) that a section (two guns) of mountain artillery should be retained in Chitral either as part of the equipment of the Scouts or in store for manning by regulars who would have to be sent up to meet an emergency.

#### PESHAWAR DISTRICT (EXCLUDING CHITRAL).

**98. Location and duties.**—The troops of the Peshawar District, excluding the Risalpur cavalry brigade which is allotted to the Field Army, consists of the garrisons of Peshawar, the Khyber, Nowshera, Mardan and the Malakand and include the units now located in the Khajuri and Aka Khel plains. Apart from their role within the administered district, which is in the nature of internal security duties, their responsibilities include the normal function of Covering Troops on the Buner, Utman Khel, Mohmand and Afridi borders and the holding of strategic points and lines of communication in the Khyber Pass and the Malakand.

**99. Khajuri Plains.**—We have carefully reviewed the strength of these garrisons in the light of their responsibilities and of the events of 1930. We have also noted the additional commitments presented by the measures now being undertaken in the Khajuri and Aka Khel plains. When the proposals for the construction of these trans-border posts and roads were first submitted

to the Government of India, the Chief Commissioner estimated that it would be necessary to raise two new corps of Scouts, one of 1,200 and the other of 900 men to implement the measure. The local authorities both political and military are now of opinion that the posts should continue to be held by regulars, and with this we agree. The object of the posts is of an eminently military nature, namely, to protect Peshawar from Afridi incursions, and they are located in close proximity to the district border in an area where the special functions and capabilities of Scouts would find little or no scope. The work can be more efficiently carried out by regulars and certainly much more cheaply, provided that the garrison can be found from our existing resources. At the moment the necessary strength of two battalions is being found by one battalion taken from the Khyber and the second from elsewhere in the Northern Command.

100. When relations with the Afridis are restored to normal, we consider that it should be possible to provide both battalions from the existing garrison of Peshawar District. This will entail some weakening of strength either in the Khyber, which would have to be made good on mobilisation, or of the mobile columns, but this should in some measure be compensated by the advantages resulting from the steps adopted in the Khajuri and Aka Khel plains, and, taking into consideration the offensive power of the air arm, should not reduce the margin of security unduly.

101. **Reductions considered.**—In the light of the above remarks we do not consider that any reduction of arms other than artillery can be contemplated. We would certainly not suggest any change in the Malakand where, in our opinion, the small garrison of one battalion more than pulls its weight as a steady factor in an area in which political equilibrium is far from stable.

102. **Artillery.**—With regard to the artillery allotted to the Covering Troops in Peshawar District, we consider that some reduction should be possible. We understand that on mobilisation one field battery is required for Kohat. Even so, the district would have three field batteries and one medium battery, apart from mountain artillery, and while we must leave it to the military authorities to decide what could best be dispensed with, we consider that a reduction of at any rate one battery could be made, and careful investigation should be made whether further reductions are not possible.

#### KOHAT DISTRICT.

103. The garrison of Kohat District is faced with considerable responsibilities of a somewhat complicated nature in that its defensive role includes the protection of Kohat, the Miranzai and Kurram valleys against the Orakzai, a portion of the Afridis, the Zaimukhts and Chamkannis on the Indian side of the Frontier, and against Afghan incursions from Khost and the area west of the Peiwar. The district is also not altogether free from repercussions from Waziristan owing to the proximity of the Kabul Khel Wazirs to the south west, and it is only in this area that there has been any extension of control across the border.

104. The normal peace time garrison is small consisting only of one cavalry regiment, two mountain batteries and six battalions and has to be re-inforced in war mainly by two battalions from Multan. Military opinion would like to have these battalions permanently located in the Kohat District and this would naturally facilitate mobilisation problems. But to do so would involve heavy expenditure on accommodation and would probably meet with some opposition from the Punjab Government. These are considerations which we think are sufficiently weighty to rule out the proposal.

105. We have no recommendations to make for any immediate reduction or redistribution, but we consider that the question of the battalion located at Hangu and the Samana should be kept under review in the light of any developments which may occur in the so-called Shia Salient of Orakzai territory. If, as we advocate elsewhere, we are able to meet the wishes of these Orakzai clans by some extension of control over their area, the security of that portion of the Miranzai valley in the vicinity of Hangu should be considerably increased and in such circumstances it might be possible to make

over the Samana posts to the Frontier Constabulary. It might then be considered advantageous to transfer the Hangu battalion elsewhere within the district if it is not to be brought under reductions and, in order to avoid expenditure on new construction, it would be for consideration whether use could not be made of the existing accommodation for personnel at Arawali.

106. In the Kurram the position is peculiarly favourable in that the interest of the Shia population, surrounded by potentially hostile Sunni neighbours, are practically identical with those of Government and the problem of defence is consequently enormously simplified. The loyalty and goodwill of the inhabitants naturally applies with still greater force to the Kurram Militia which, with the exception of two Mahsud platoons is locally enlisted. And we may mention here that the Mahsud element has so far proved entirely satisfactory and gave a good account of itself in the disturbances of 1930.

107. The sanctioned strength of the Kurram Militia is—

- 6 British officers,
- 1,237 Militia infantry,
- 64 Militia mounted infantry,
- 2 mountain guns.

The annual cost is approximately Rs. 7·20 lakhs. At present a temporary increase has been made of six platoons which the local political and militia officers are anxious to make permanent, in order to meet additional commitments in the Peiwar area, for a permanent post on the Chamkanni border and to guard the Royal Air Force advanced depot at Arawali. In our opinion a definite case has not yet been made out for any permanent increase in the Militia, and we are anxious to avoid any further obligations. With regard to the Peiwar, the ideal solution is that the Afghans and the Government of India should agree to a self-denying ordinance by which both parties should refrain from holding any defensive post within a certain distance of the frontier. We are not without hope that some such agreement may be found possible, and in the meantime expenditure on permanent additions to the establishment of the Militia and on new posts is to be deprecated. On the Chamkanni border we consider that the garrison for the proposed post might be found by seasonal distribution. To find the small garrison for the Royal Air Force depot at Arawali we suggest that the old Arawali post and Chapri post might be made over to Turi levies and the Militia so released employed at the air depot.

118. As a general principle we have advocated elsewhere that small militia or Scout posts should be eliminated as far as possible and only larger and more important posts retained. While we consider that in general this should still hold good in the case of the Kurram Militia in order to increase the size of the mobile striking force, in its application more latitude should be allowed. With a friendly population the militia posts can act as nuclei for local defensive measures carried out by the inhabitants, for whom rifles are held in store for issue in times of emergency. In the conditions existing in the Kurram the danger of small isolated posts is largely reduced.

#### WAZIRISTAN.

109. The armed forces in Waziristan are dealt with in Part IV (Waziristan).

#### BALUCHISTAN.

110. The basic difference between Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province so far as the tribal problem is concerned has been described elsewhere in our report. The effect on our military dispositions is naturally very marked. The only area in which a tribal problem exists in any way comparable to that of the North-West Frontier Province is in the Zhob Valley, and, with the exception of two units included in Baluchistan Military District Covering Troops are confined to the Zhob, the remainder of the garrisons belonging to the Field Army.

111. **Zhob garrison.**—The Zhob garrison consists of one cavalry regiment, one mountain battery and 4 battalions infantry, the main force being located



at Fort Sandeman, which also furnishes a detachment of two companies at Hindu Bagh. The cavalry regiment and one battalion are located at Loralai. The factors of potential trouble in this area are Ghilzai raids and incursions from across the Afghan border or from the direction of the Gumal River; Wazir incursions from the direction of Wana; a certain measure of danger, as in 1919, from the local tribes—Shirani, Kakar and Mando Khel—who possess a considerable number of arms and are liable to be upset by external influences; and, as regards the Loralai garrison in particular, the Marri and Bugti tribes.

112. The distinctive feature of the Zhob lies mainly in the long distances which separate its scattered centres of population and of administrative control. The remedy for this is the improvement of communications and much has already been done in this way. But, even so, great distances must entail dispersion and dispersion militates against economy of force.

113. **Hindubagh and Loralai.**—The Agent to the Governor General has impressed upon us the importance of the small force of regulars at Hindubagh as a stabilising factor on the long line of communications connecting Fort Sandeman with Quetta and as a support to the militia posts thrown out towards the Afghan border. His views are fully concurred in by the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Western Command. Similarly Colonel Bruce presses strongly for the retention of the present Loralai garrison. We find it difficult to run counter to their views and for the time being we advocate no change in the Zhob.

114. **Effect of Wana on Zhob.**—It is obvious also that the military situation in the Zhob will be closely affected by any change in defensive dispositions in Waziristan. In the part of our report dealing with Waziristan we have envisaged certain reductions, and should these take place and the Wana garrison be withdrawn, it will be for consideration whether some increase in the Zhob garrison may not be necessary. Admittedly a force stationed in the Zhob at a distance of 53 miles from the Gumal River and 91 miles from Wana can only make its weight felt to a limited extent in South Waziristan, but its influence will not be negligible and we must be prepared to use it. In this connection the completion of the Fort Sandeman and Gul Kach-Tanai road up to Mechanical Transport standard is most important, and the need for the road from Fort Sandeman to Dera Ismail Khan *via* Dhana Sar, which is now pressed for by the Agent to the Governor General on political and economic grounds, will be emphasised by strategic considerations. The Zhob Militia are dealt with in the part of our report which refers to the Armed Civil Forces in Baluchistan.

115. **Baluchistan District.**—In Baluchistan District we consider that some reduction should be possible. There are two battalions in the district allotted to Covering Troops, of these one is at Pishin, the other at Quetta. The latter is the only battalion left at Quetta when, on mobilisation, the units of the Field Army move out in accordance with the plan of operations, and it is entrusted with the essential duties of the protection of Quetta with its depots, arsenal and aerodrome and also with the guarding of the vital railway line through the Belan Pass. These duties it has to fulfil single handed until re-inforced later by a battalion of the Indian States forces.

116. The Pishin battalion can, we consider, be dispensed with now that improved means of communication and transport have brought this place within such easy reach of Quetta. We therefore recommend its reduction.

117. **Summary of Reductions Recommended.**—Summarising the reductions in regular garrisons maintained on the frontier which we consider should be possible, we arrive at the following:—

1 Indian Infantry battalion.	}	Chitral.
1 Section Mountain battery.		
1 Section S. and M.		
Certain ancillary details.		
1 Field battery . . . . .		Peshawar.
1 Indian Infantry battalion . . . . .		Manzai.*
1 Indian Infantry battalion . . . . .		Baluchistan District.

\* See Waziristan Part IV.

118. If redistribution in Waziristan develops on the lines we have indicated in Part IV, a reduction of one Indian battalion of the present Wana garrison would take place in the first stage, followed later by further reductions which might amount to two more Indian Infantry battalions and considerable consequential reductions in ancillary services.

#### (E) FINANCIAL EFFECT OF REDUCTIONS.

119. The financial effect of these reductions can be indicated rather than stated. The ultimate savings which in theory may result from the disbandment of units of the army are known, but owing to a number of complicating factors these savings cannot accrue immediately, and may never be realised in actual cash to the extent of the estimate. The figures for the ultimate savings on units being disbanded have been calculated so as to allow for the reduction of incidental expenditure, such as the cost of training companies connected with infantry regiments, but do not allow for exceptional charges like those involved in rationing a battalion in Chitral. Our estimates are made with full knowledge of their limitations. The savings consequent on the reduction of an Indian infantry battalion, a battery of Field Artillery, a section of Mountain Artillery, and a section of Sappers and Miners have been assumed to be Rs. 6·75 lakhs, Rs. 8·38 lakhs, Rs. 1 lakh and Rs. 45 lakhs respectively. If the units mentioned in the previous paragraph are actually disbanded a reduction of expenditure to the extent of Rs. 30·08 lakhs may be anticipated. To this should be added the exceptional cost of rationing the force at Drosh, the cost of some ancillary services and the cost of reliefs, the total of which is taken to be Rs. 2 lakhs, and the gross savings on our programme of reduction will then be Rs. 32·08 lakhs. Against this must be set the cost of retaining the six platoons of Frontier Constabulary to be substituted for the infantry garrison at Manzai\* (Rs. 1 lakh) and of re-organising the Chitral Scouts (Rs. 1·5 lakhs). The net savings will then be Rs. 29·58 lakhs or Rs. 29½ lakhs in round figures. The removal of the force from Chitral will make unnecessary the expenditure of Rs. 5·67 lakhs on new quarters which has already been sanctioned, and any expense involved in providing extra accommodation for the Chitral Scouts is unlikely to exceed fifty thousand rupees.

#### (F) LOCALISATION.

120. We have considered whether economy and efficiency would be promoted by re-introducing a force specialised in mountain warfare on the lines of the old Punjab Frontier Force, and if so, of what size that force should be and how the obvious objections could be met.

121. **Mobility.**—Many of our witnesses held the view that the existing regular formations were too ponderous to deal with situations such as occurred in 1930 in Waziristan and during the Afidi incursions into the Peshawar plain, and that the mobility of units themselves was handicapped by the present type of equipment and training. These witnesses considered that units specially trained and equipped to meet an unorganised enemy at his own game and on his own ground would have been more efficient for the purpose. We are inclined to agree with these views, but the issues have to some extent become confused and it seems to us necessary to clear them before going further. In the first place mobility as used by those who expressed such views is a word of two meanings. It includes both the mobility conferred by the existence of roads and the provision of motor transport and the ability to move off roads especially in mountainous country. In the first respect our forces, both regular and irregular, are in our opinion better off now than they have ever been before, and the completion of the roads recommended elsewhere in this report will leave little to be desired so far as this form of mobility is concerned. In respect of the other form of mobility we maintain that comparisons between the celerity of Scouts and the slowness of regulars are out of place and those who draw them have lost sight of the essential difference of function between the regular and the irregular. It is agreed all round

\*See Part IV Waziristan.



that the admirable speed with which the Scouts move over the hills of Waziristan is incompatible with the fire power necessary to overcome strong opposition and that in the face of such opposition the Scouts would not be able to move at all. It is also common knowledge that the mobility, in this sense, of any force must vary inversely with its size. Scout patrols are small parties, but the function of regulars is to operate in strength. Those therefore who look to see formed bodies of regulars move with the speed of Scouts are expecting the impossible. The issue does not lie between regulars and irregulars, and the location of Scouts in very large numbers at Razmak, which some of our witnesses suggested, would not solve the problem. It would only result in these Scouts losing their essential characteristics as irregulars. The question really is whether for some portion of the Army in India, in view of the primary purpose it has to fulfil and of the terrain in which it is most likely to operate, some change of standard equipment and some specialisation in training are worth while even at the cost of some sacrifice of fire power. We recognise that this is a matter for military experts to work out, taking into consideration the increase of mobility which the development of air supply may afford. But we venture to express the opinion that for reasons which we proceed to develop, the idea might receive very careful consideration.

**122. Training and equipment.**—As regards training, our military witnesses were emphatic that any good unit can quickly become as expert in mountain warfare as others of longer local experience. That is no doubt true, but it is beside the point. The point is first whether specialised units carrying lighter clothing and equipment, specially trained and well versed in the tactics and wiles of the tribesmen, would not be better adapted for dealing with a tribal enemy than ordinary units of the Indian Army equipped on present lines; and second, whether by employing such specialised units some economy of troops might not be effected. The majority of our expert witnesses answered both questions in the affirmative and we are inclined to agree with them, though we cannot go so far as to say, as some did, that specialised training would enable three battalions to take the place of four (as at present constituted).

**123. Disadvantages.**—One disadvantage of localisation is that the units localised will be less suitable for theatres of operations other than the frontier. It is in contravention of the principle governing the organisation and equipment of the army, that is 'The organisation must be suited to average rather than to exceptional conditions and be based, as far as possible, on a common standard throughout the empire.....' However, a quota of troops must in all circumstances be maintained on the frontier, and warfare under frontier conditions of enemy and terrain is the most likely task of the Army in India. Further it seems probable that India under its new constitution will be less able to maintain and train an army on fully imperial lines, particularly if future developments at home tend towards further mechanisation and an increased proportion of automatic weapons.

**124.** A more serious disadvantage is that the excellent training facilities that the frontier affords would be enjoyed by fewer units, and that non-localised units, deprived of prospects of active service in the most probable theatre of war, would lose enthusiasm and, consequently, efficiency. To lessen this disadvantage it is considered that a proportion only of the regular troops located on the frontier should be localised.

**125. Conditions of service.**—It is probable that continuous trans-border service would not be generally acceptable to officers or even to long service N. C. Os. To meet this it would be necessary to alternate trans-border stations with cis-border stations such as Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and possibly Quetta. It might even prove necessary to officer the force by volunteers seconded for a period of years. In that event Indian officers holding the King's Commission would of course be eligible to serve with units of the localised force. If seconding of officers were not considered necessary, we think that for the present no Indianised units should be amongst those localised.

**126. Gurkha units.**—It is for consideration whether Gurkha units though not localised might not be equipped and trained on the same lines as the localised force.

127. **Recommendations.**—We admit that the idea of localisation is somewhat reactionary and taken on its merits we would have some hesitation in recommending such a scheme. But with an increased measure of Indianisation it may be necessary to give Indianised units time to find themselves under less difficult and strenuous conditions than the frontier, and the resuscitation of something on the lines of the Punjab Frontier Force might provide a satisfactory solution.

128. We therefore wish to suggest the consideration of this proposal by the military authorities. Our tentative suggestions are that eight localised battalions might be located trans-border, say in Waziristan and the Zhob. In order to provide alternative stations eight more battalions could be stationed cis-border, say, in the Peshawar and Kohat Districts, making a total of sixteen localised battalions.

129. Details of the equipment of this force will require careful study by the military authorities. We merely put forward the suggestion that perhaps Lewis guns might be dispensed with and machine guns not increased beyond six per battalion, should a higher number be introduced in the Indian Army generally.

## PART IV.

## WAZIRISTAN.

## (A) POLICY.

130. **Genesis of the present policy.**—Waziristan is a mountainous country between the Afghan frontier and the border of British India. It stretches from the Kurram river in the north to the Gomal river in the south and is of about the same size as Yorkshire. The sketch map attached to our report shows the chief places in and near Waziristan and the metalled roads which have been constructed.

131. Constant depredations in the adjoining districts of British India committed by the tribes inhabiting Waziristan, especially the Mahsuds, had been one of the chief difficulties of border administration ever since the annexation of the Punjab. During the Great War the tract on the Derajat border adjacent to Mahsud country suffered very severely, and when in 1919 under pressure of the Afghan War certain posts held by menzils in the upper Tochi Valley and at Wana were evacuated, the tale of Mahsud and Wazir depredations in the Derajat at once rose to such a pitch that neither life nor property, especially for Hindus, could be called safe anywhere in the Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan Districts. To end this intolerable situation, as soon as means admitted after the Afghan War, operations were undertaken against the tribes of Waziristan towards the end of 1919. These lasted for nearly four years and entailed very heavy expenditure. Especially stubborn opposition was offered by the Mahsuds in the cold weather of 1919-20 to the advance of a column from Jandola by the Takki Zam valley to the neighbourhood of Makin. Towards the close of the operations in Waziristan correspondence arose between the Secretary of State for India and the Government of India as to the future of the country. In 1922 it was decided that the policy in Waziristan was to be the control of Waziristan. It was further agreed that the essentials for carrying out this policy were:—

- (a) The location of strong forces in one or more central dominating positions in Waziristan.
- (b) The construction of a system of metalled roads connecting these positions with British India and with one another.
- (c) The disposition at nodal points along these roads of posts to be held by Scouts—an irregular all-Pathan but non-local force with British officers.
- (d) The employment of a large number of local tribesmen, providing their own arms, as Khassadars.
- (e) The grant of increased tribal allowances to recompense the tribes for the increased responsibilities imposed on them and the increased facilities required in their country, and to consolidate the position of the tribal mahks.

132. **Details of policy.**—The application of these principles remained to be worked out. It was finally decided—

- (i) that for the control of Waziristan a force of 16 battalions of infantry, with complementary troops of other arms, located in the Waziristan Military District, was required. This force was in time to be reduced to 12 battalions;
- (ii) that of these a strong force of regular troops of all arms should be located at Razmak on the edge of Unmuzzai Wazir country, whence it could at any rate dominate Makin, one of the three centres of tribal life in Waziristan. The other two centres are Kaniguram, which like Makin is in Mahsud country, and Wana, in the country of the Ahmadzai Wazirs. The location of one brigade out of the remainder of the Waziristan force, whether at Wana or elsewhere, in tribal territory was left for subsequent decision;

(iii) that the system of metalled roads should in the first instance consist of roads—

- (a) from Bannu *viâ* Idak and Miranshah to Datta Khel at the head of the Tochi Valley,
- (b) from a point on the Bannu-Datta Khel road between Idak and Miranshah to Razmak,
- (c) from Bannu to Tank *viâ* the Bain Pass, and thence along the district border to Draban,
- (d) from Tank *viâ* Manzai, Jandola and the Takki Zam valley to Razmak,
- (e) from Jandola *viâ* the Shahur valley and Sarwakai to Wana,
- (f) a final direct connection between Razmak and Wana *viâ* Kani-guram was also considered desirable, but was not in the initial scheme.

The construction of these roads was intended to enable columns from Razmak, Bannu and Manzai by the use of motor transport to reach various points in the country whence trouble might threaten, and to carry relief to any Scout post which might be beleaguered by a tribal lashkar beyond the power of the Scouts themselves to deal with.

(iv) The main function of the Scouts was to maintain political control and to prevent raiding, and the effective discharge of their duties in normal times was held to be best fulfilled by constant and vigorous patrolling in strength sufficient to overcome any raiding gangs likely to be encountered.

(v) As regards the Khassadars, the disclosed intention was that they should be the agency by which the tribes were enabled to discharge the obligations into which they had entered, and should develop into a sort of tribal police. A further latent intention was that they should also be an agency for peaceful penetration and the extension of Government's influence in the remoter parts of tribal territory.

133. Measures to implement the policy.—To carry out this policy Government at present maintains in the Waziristan Military District (which includes Bannu)

(a) a force of regular troops disposed as regards its main units as follows :—

Place.	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Infantry.
Bannu . . . .	1 regiment less 1 squadron.	....	2 battalions.
Idak . . . .	..	....	1 battalion.
Razmak . . . .	..	3 pack batteries, 1 section medium battery 6 hows.	6 battalions.
Wana . . . .	1 squadron.	1 pack battery . .	3 battalions.
Manzai . . . .	..	..	1 battalion.
Total . . . .	1 regiment	4 Pack batteries, 1 section medium artillery.	13 battalions.

(b) a flight of aeroplanes at Miranshah,

(c) two corps of Scouts, with headquarters respectively at Miranshah and Jandola, of an aggregate strength of approximately 5,000 men,

(d) a force of about 4,500 Khassadars recruited wholly from the local tribes and providing their own arms.

Besides these, in a number of posts along the border and in Shirani country to the south of the Gumal river is a force of Frontier Constabulary which in 1924-25 amounted to about 2,800 men. It has since been considerably reduced. A small number of District Levies is also employed in the Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan Districts.

The annual cost of the military forces including District and Brigade headquarters, Sapper and Miner, Pioneer, Supply, Mechanical Transport and Medical units is difficult to ascertain with more than roughly approximate accuracy. As near as we have been able to make out it is—

	(In lakhs of rupees.)
Military (including stores) . . . . .	166.90
Civil . . . . .	60.33
To these must be added the cost of the political staff . . . . .	3.44
and of the tribal allowances per annum . . . . .	2.75
Total . . . . .	<hr/> 233.42 <hr/>

It is of course realised that this expenditure is not all extra cost, and that a large part of the military expenditure would have to be incurred had there been no movement forward in to Waziristan.

**134. Success of present policy.**—In our enquiry we made a point of asking our witnesses to what extent in their opinion the policy had succeeded and to what agencies they ascribed the measure of success achieved. The general opinion, which we share, was that the policy has achieved a remarkable measure of success. Control had indeed not advanced to the point of any appreciable extension of administration, nor was anything like a beginning of tribal disarmament as yet in sight. But a great deal had been done. The adjoining districts had enjoyed unprecedented immunity from raids. Waziristan had ceased to be a happy home for outlaws and many had been arrested or surrendered. With the consent of the tribes the prosecution of tribal feuds on and near the roads had been forbidden. Inter-tribal fighting on the Razmak plateau had been stopped. The area within which Scouts could patrol, or British officers under Khassadar escort move, without giving offence to the tribes had been greatly enlarged. As for the agencies by which these results had been secured, our conclusion on the facts and opinions before us is that in the beginning the first factor and the plinth upon which the whole rested was the fighting power of the troops manifested during the operations of 1919-23. Since then the main factors have been the stabilising effect of the strong force of regulars at Razmak and the demonstration of its ability to move at will along the roads; the steadily increasing development of air power, which has enabled Government to nip trouble in the bud and prevented disturbances from spreading; the roads and the consequent development of motor traffic, and the diffusion of money amongst the tribesmen from Khassadar service and from works and supply contracts; the creation of new wants and contact with the outside world. Finally the list will not be complete without reference to the excellent work done by the Scouts. Their constant patrols have not only kept raiders at home, but have enlarged the area of penetration and provided increased means of contact with the local population. Their work has both a civil and military side and in both spheres has been equally valuable.

**135. Financial implications.**—The policy then is succeeding and bears promise for the future. But it is undeniably expensive, and in the conditions which obtain or impend, while we should like to see it carried on and developed, we deem it our duty to make suggestions as to the manner in which this may be done not only without increasing expenditure, but with some hope of progressive reduction. For reasons given elsewhere no reduction of tribal allowances appears possible. The same applies to the aggregate amount paid to the tribes as Khassadari. But the basic wage can, we think, be reduced, so that in time the whole corps of Khassadars, including the additional numbers who will be required for the Razmak-Wana road, of which we regard the early completion as essential, will be on a Rs. 25 basis with six men employed where there are five now. It is difficult to exaggerate the unsettling effect on the tribal mind of visible indications of fundamental change of policy, and if we were to look at Waziristan only we should certainly advocate continuance of the present policy by existing methods, supplemented by such developments as air power has made practicable, and with as little visible change as possible. Much, as we have said, has been done

but more remains to do. The occupation, despite the material benefits which it has brought, is not yet by any means universally popular among the tribesmen and any slackening of control would have most dangerous consequences. Unfortunately it is not possible at the present juncture to look only at Waziristan, and for reasons which we have elsewhere pointed out we think it essential to work towards a policy of progressive reduction of commitments in the future. This in effect means that, with the help that the development of air power can give, the attempt should be made to continue to produce the same results with less means and at less expenditure.

**136. The Wana garrison.**—Wana is a centre peculiarly exposed to Afghan intrigue and the presence of a brigade (3 battalions) of regular troops there has already proved itself a stabilising factor of great value. The removal of that brigade, even though replaced by Scouts, is a visible indication of change, if not of policy at least of method, and as such undesirable. But with the completion of the road system by the construction of the Razmak-Wana road and the development of air power we think it legitimate to take risks which could not be faced in the past. Provided therefore that the Razmak foundation is meanwhile left substantially as it is, and that co-operation between machines in the air and forces moving on the ground is actively developed, we think that the foundation will be capable of carrying the whole load. Both the Resident and the Commander of the Waziristan District suggested the location of the Wana Brigade at Kaniguram. From a purely local point of view there is much to be said in favour of this, but the location of regular troops at Kaniguram would constitute a commitment from which it would be even more difficult to withdraw than from Wana and, as we are only in favour of redistribution if this opens the way to reduction, we cannot recommend this as an ultimate solution.

**137. Bannu Brigade.**—We are not suggesting any change in the disposition of regular troops in Bannu and North Waziristan. In the light of events in Bannu District during the summer of 1930, and the unlikelihood of the light railway being extended from Bannu to Mir Ali in the near future, we agree with the G. O. C. in C., Northern Command, that the scheme for reducing the Bannu garrison to only one battalion and concentrating the remainder of the Bannu Brigade at Mir Ali needs reconsideration. We suggest that only the troops now located at Idak should be transferred to Mir Ali. We have not contemplated the location of any Royal Air Force unit at Bannu.

**138. Suggested programme**—Having regard to all aspects of the problem we put forward the following programme to which we think that Government might work. Our recommendations are to be regarded as only tentative and at each step the position must be carefully reviewed before the next is taken.

**1931-32.**—All steps for the acquisition of further land for a cantonment at Wana should be stopped forthwith and no permanent construction of military buildings there sanctioned.

During the summer of 1931 the Mahsud and Ahmadzai Wazir jirgas should be informed that Government has decided to complete the road from Razmak *via* Tauda China-Ladha-Kaniguram and the upper Baddar Valley to Wana and an understanding reached with them as to the additional Khas-sadars required and the reduction of the basic wage to Rs. 25 for new recruitments. Every effort should be made to keep the number of new Khassadars down as much as possible and to arrange for protection by temporary badraggas.

In the autumn of 1931 construction should begin. The road has already been made as far as Ladha from the Razmak end and its completion is likely to take two years. The estimated cost is Rs. 20 lakhs.

At whatever moment during 1931-32 this may be convenient for military and political reasons the battalion now at Manzai should be withdrawn. It can be replaced at Manzai by the six platoons of Frontier Constabulary which in our examination of that force we found superfluous to probable needs after the restoration of normal conditions.

**1932-33.**—Road construction continues.

A Scout post is established at Ladha.

With the progress of the road a temporary post or fortified camp will be required in the upper Baddar Valley for occupation by Scouts.

**1933-34.**—Road construction is completed and the badraggas are paid off and dismissed.

In the autumn of 1933 the Wana Brigade is moved to Sarwakai, or wherever else in tribal territory may be thought suitable, and remains encamped there for six months. It is replaced at Wana by Scouts.

During this period we suggest the importance from a political point of view of the free movement of troops, with air co-operation including air supply. In this connection we refer to our remarks in Part III with regard to the provision of a Heavy Transport squadron.

**1934-35.**—In the spring two of the three battalions of the Wana Brigade move to Razmak or temporarily to the Kani Guram area and the third is brought under reduction. In the autumn of the same year it will be for consideration whether these two additional battalions temporarily located at Razmak or Kani Guram can be dispensed with altogether.

**139. Subsequent developments.**—In attempting to sketch out the above programme we have already ventured to look some distance into the future, and further than this we cannot go in anything but the most general terms. So far as we can foresee, the retention of a strong force of regulars will always be necessary at Razmak. But if no set-back occurs to peaceful progress in Waziristan, and with the further development of air power, reductions in transport and other ancillary services may be found possible which might be followed at a later stage by further reductions in combatant units.

Whether subsequently one of the Razmak battalions could with advantage be replaced by a force of seven or eight hundred Scouts or not is another point which might then be further examined. The Commander of the Waziristan District referred to the advantages derived in time of war from the co-operation of Scouts with regulars, and the inclusion of some irregulars in the Razmak garrison might be found desirable. But we do not think that in any case additional Scouts should be recruited for the purpose. If the country in North Waziristan has been sufficiently pacified to admit of such a force being provided by redistribution, the idea might be worth pursuing. But beyond that in suggesting any proposal for the replacement of regulars by irregulars in Razmak we are at present not prepared to go, as we regard the additional recruitment of Scouts in large numbers to replace regulars as unsound in principle.

#### (B.) SCOUTS (IN WAZIRISTAN).

**140.** The Scouts in Waziristan are organised in two corps, the Tochi Scouts, strength 12 British Officers, 2,290 Indian ranks, and the South Waziristan Scouts, strength 14 British Officers, 2,761 Indian ranks—a total of 26 British Officers, 5,051 Indian ranks. Included in the above figures are 124 mounted infantry in the Tochi Scouts and 125 mounted infantry in the South Waziristan Scouts. The annual cost of the Tochi and South Waziristan Scouts is approximately Rs. 14.45 and Rs. 19.40 lakhs respectively.

**141. Control.**—Since the events of 1919, the Scout Corps in Waziristan have been entirely reorganised and they now constitute a well trained and disciplined force of considerable strength, local only in so far as it is permanently stationed in Waziristan but, though all Pathan, foreign in its composition, with the exception of two platoons of Wazirs in the Tochi Scouts. There are perhaps certain anomalies, in a force of this size, composition and standard of training being under the Resident, who has thus to shoulder this responsibility in addition to his many other duties. It is, however, most important that for the ordinary incidents of political work trans-border the Resident and his Political Agents should be able to call upon the Scouts without the delay of reference to higher authority. In view of the essentially political nature of the duties which Scouts normally perform, we do not consider that



the command of the Scouts should be vested in the military commander in peace time. Army requirements are met by the Scouts coming under military command in war, when political authority will also pass to the military, and in the case of minor operations by such of the Scouts as are actually co-operating with the regulars being placed under the military commander concerned.

**142. Distribution in the Tochi.**—In Part II we have indicated that as a general principle Scouts should be concentrated in posts of sufficient size to enable patrolling to be freely carried out and for them to operate as a small mobile force. This policy has already been carried out so far as appears possible at present in the Tochi Scouts. Further redistribution on the same lines should be feasible in due course when local conditions admit. For example, when a bridge has been constructed over the Tochi river at Boya, it should be possible to dispense with this small post. Also, the time should not be far distant when the reduction, of the Scout garrison of the Khajuri and Shinki sector can be contemplated. When any reduction of this nature can be made, we understand that the Chief Commissioner suggests the reoccupation of Shewa Post by the Tochi Scouts instead of by Khassadars, who have now replaced the original Scout garrison. However, we are inclined to think that requirements in South Waziristan will have a prior claim on any platoons released from the Tochi.

**143. Redistribution in South Waziristan.**—The position in South Waziristan is far less stabilised than in the Tochi. The programme of road construction has still to be completed, and the changes in the location of regular troops, which the Committee contemplate may have to be adopted will radically alter the situation as regards the Scouts.

Pursuing the principle of concentration, we recommend giving up the posts at Splitoi and Kotkai, which will provide a strength of ten platoons for the new post which we consider will be required at Ladha as soon as the Razmak-Wana road reaches that place.

With the extension of the road towards the Lare La pass, a second post will be necessary in the upper Baddar Valley, probably near Hathi Khel. We consider, however, that a temporary post or fortified camp suitable for occupation in the summer months only should suffice in this locality. The posts at Jandola and Sarwakai and to a less extent that at Sorarogha can be looked upon as in a sense complementary to the post in the upper Baddar, the local population moving roughly between those areas according to the season of the year. Our proposal is therefore that the strength required for the upper Baddar post in summer, which we estimate at ten platoons, should be found from the Jandola, Sarwakai and Sorarogha garrisons. In the winter the upper Baddar post would be left in the charge of Khassadars and the Scouts would return to their previous dispositions.

This will still leave a Scout garrison to be formed for Wana should regulars be withdrawn, and at a minimum we consider this should consist of not less than ten platoons. Possibly some of the required number of platoons might be found, as mentioned above, by redistribution in the Tochi, but it will certainly be necessary to raise some new platoons.

**144. Command.**—Assuming Wana to be made over to Scouts and additional Scouts raised for this purpose, we think it will be necessary to place the South Waziristan Scouts under a more senior officer of the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel and divide the corps into two wings with a common headquarters at Jandola.

**145. Post Guns Mechanical Transport and Wireless Telegraphy.**—With the concentration of Scouts in the more important posts and with the added responsibilities they will have to assume, we consider that they should be provided with post guns at places such as Miranshah, Datta Khel, Ladha, Sorarogha, Sarwakai and Wana. The presence of guns will add considerably to the defensive power of the posts, but more particularly do we advocate this measure for its moral effect upon the garrison and upon any tribal lashkar that might attempt to attack the post. Also, some extra provision of mechanical transport will, we consider, be necessary to enable patrolling

and measures to intercept raiders being continued although the Scouts will no longer be holding a chain of intermediate posts. The new posts will also require wireless telegraphy.

### (C) FINANCIAL EFFECT OF PROGRAMME.

146. The estimate of savings is framed with the reservations made in Part III. The financial effect of the programme depends on the extent to which the reduction of the Wana Brigade is carried out, but on the assumption of reduction in full, and allowance being made for economies in ancillary services to the extent of Rs. 1·5 lakhs, the gross savings will amount to Rs. 24·04 lakhs. Against this must be set the estimated cost of the proposals in connection with Scouts (Rs. 3·75 lakhs) and Khassadars (Rs. 1·25 lakhs) and the net financial effect of the reduction of the Wana Brigade taken to be Rs. 19 lakhs. The amount of the most recent estimate for Wana Cantonment is, we understand, approximately Rs. 50 lakhs. This expenditure will not be necessary, and the cost of the Razmak-Wana road and of the extra Scout posts involved in our scheme is not likely to exceed Rs. 35 lakhs.

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## PART V.

### ROADS AND POSTS.

**147. Importance of roads.**—It is impossible to emphasise too strongly the importance of roads in the settlement of the tribal problem. The part they play in increasing the defensive power of all the ground forces by promoting mobility, and facilitating concentration at threatened points, is too obvious to require explanation and was demonstrated in the events of the summer of 1930 when two battalions were moved from Peshawar to Razmak to reinforce the column in twenty-four hours. Their value in tribal areas is not limited to their providing facilities for the passage of troops. Roads are a great, if not the greatest, factor operating to bring civilising influences to bear on the tribes. While under construction they afford work and money to ease the economic problem, and after construction their influence is not less vital. The Mahsuds have suggested that Government should with their support establish a zone of security for two miles on each side of the Razmak-Jandola Road. The Garrison Engineer, South Waziristan, received an enquiry from the Powindas about the completion of the Tanai-Gul Kach road as they intended to convey their merchandise from Gul Kach to the plains by motor transport, if it was fit for use. Our witnesses declared that the tribesmen in Waziristan were so affected by the discomfort of travelling with their arms in crowded motor lorries that they were beginning to leave their rifles at home, and to make their own arrangements for picqueting the road. The large expenditure on roads in Waziristan has been money well spent.

**148. Policy of road development.**—The present policy of road development in tribal areas is to open as many tracks fit for fair weather motor traffic as funds will permit and the tribes will accept. When the volume of traffic has confirmed its value as a means of communication the track can be converted into an all weather road with the requisite culverts and bridges. We consider that this policy is the correct one, and that tracks fit for occasional motor traffic, costing fifteen to twenty-five thousand rupees per mile to construct, and one hundred rupees per mile to maintain, should be multiplied where justification for them exists, to the extent that funds will allow. On the whole these tracks afford better value for money than the more expensive metalled roads except in the case of the main arteries of traffic. We consider that their advantages are not limited to tribal areas but that in cis-border districts, there is considerable scope for development on these lines.

**149. System of constructing works.**—The contract system, which involves the giving of contracts for work to tribal contractors nominated by the political officers, has given rise to abuses and is gradually being abandoned for the ordinary open tender system. That in Waziristan the Mahsud contractor is tendering for and obtaining contracts in competition with contractors from India is evidence not only of the ability and adaptability of the Mahsud, but of the civilising influence of the Waziristan policy. Schedules of rates are prepared on exactly the same basis whether the works to be constructed are in cis-border or in trans-border areas, and differences in cost of construction, apart from the royalty to be paid to the tribes, depend generally on the variations in the cost of local labour, and on the distance imported materials have to be transported. The percentages which have been fixed for royalty payable to the tribes are not unreasonable in the circumstances. These reforms have not yet been fully developed in all the tribal areas, and more difficulty is being experienced in the Khyber area than elsewhere. But in various ways the maliks are being made to understand how extortionate their demands have been, and the vicious system which led to exaggerated surcharges on the competitive cost of a work should soon completely disappear. In Waziristan a number of Mahsuds are being trained as stone-masons, and such attempts to introduce vocational training should be encouraged as much as possible. Our only recommendation can be that policy which is developing on such sound lines should be continued;

**150. Road programme.**—Many programmes of road construction have been laid before us, most of which could be adopted with benefit, did funds permit. Selection must be made, however, and in addition to the Razmak-Wana road, the importance of which has been emphasised elsewhere, the following seem to us to be projects which ought to be carried out in the order of their priority :—

Road.	Distance.	Approximate cost.	Purpose.	Remarks.
		Rs.		
1. Tanai-Gulkach . . .	28 miles .	3,75,000	To connect Waziristan with Zhob Valley.	Cost is without causeway or bridge over Gumal River. Funds already provided.
2 Road head in Shia Sahent to Kalaya.	About 12 miles.	Not yet estimated.	To establish greater contact with Orakzai and Afridis.	
3 Dargai-Kot Totali, Kot-Totali—Abazai or Monda	12 miles about 13 miles.	78,000 Not yet estimated.	To facilitate defensive measures against Mohmands and Utman Kh. l.	
4. Road linking Grand Trunk road and Kohat-Khushalgarh road, via Manki and Bene Ghakhe Pass.	About 42 miles.	Not yet estimated.	As alternative to vulnerable Kohat Pass road and minimise effect of any damage to either Attock or Khushalgarh bridge.	Road already partly built.
5. Completion Fort Sandeman-Dera Ismail Khan road.	15 miles .	6,60,000	To afford through communication between Baluchistan and North-West Frontier Province	
6. Rustam-Malandri Pass .	12 miles .	Not yet estimated.	To link up with Wali of Swat's road from Saidu.	

## POSTS.

**151. Policy regarding posts.**—In a climate of extremes like that of the frontier adequate provision must be made for the health and comfort of the officers and men charged with the duties of watch and ward. We were however impressed by the number of posts, many of them quite recently erected, of which the retention is no longer considered necessary by expert opinion. A post in a situation where it is not required is only a source of embarrassment, and we therefore consider that in future as a general rule, to which we recognise that there must be exceptions, the construction of expensive permanent post should be avoided and a cheaper form of accommodation substituted. We think that there should be no difficulty in devising standard pattern posts to provide accommodation for any given number of men with adequate arrangements for defence by a minimum proportion of their strength and we recommend that arrangements to this end be made. When a post has ceased to serve any useful purpose it should be pulled down rather than allow its existence to lead to the retention of a garrison which might otherwise be dispensed with or used to better advantage elsewhere.

## PART VI.

### FINANCIAL.

152. **Method of dealing with fifth term of reference.**—Financial considerations as much as any other have governed our whole enquiry, and the idea of economy has been instinct in all our deliberations. The fifth of our terms of reference, therefore, has been examined in relation to each part of the control and defence organisation, and no separate discussion of it is required. An estimate of the economies which we can foresee is given below. It should be obvious that with the duty laid upon us of examining so large a problem in so short a time as two months we could not make a detailed investigation into smaller economies possible, but had to confine ourselves to the broader issues in the enquiry. Apart from having insufficient time, we felt we were precluded from the examination of the question of frontier allowances in that the decision regarding these has been recent, and in that these allowances in so far as they are paid to superior services have been prescribed to be permanently payable under statutory rule, and would probably be protected by section 96B(2) of the Government of India Act. We venture to doubt, however, whether, if the question were reopened, the case for the payment of frontier allowances would be found now to be as strongly supported by the comparison of conditions of life on the frontier and in other parts of India as it once was.

153. **Necessity for unity of Financial Control.**—One financial recommendation of major importance we desire to make. All the arrangements for tribal control and defence of the border appear to be constituent parts of one defence organisation whether the immediate responsibility is that of the Political Department, of the Royal Air Force or of the Regular Army. Hitherto financial provision for the different parts of the organisation has been made in separate non-voted grants controlled by different authorities. This had led to the situation where an authority directs action for the financial consequences of which he is not responsible, and though we cannot say that there has been any extravagance in expenditure we consider that the position is fundamentally unsound. Further the breaking up of financial control of this defence organisation militates against the best utilisation of savings in one part of the organisation to meet excess expenditure in another. The view we take is that, after the financial settlement with the newly constituted North-West Frontier Province, the portion of civil expenditure relating to Political charges and Frontier Watch and Ward, with the connected Works expenditure will become entirely separate, and that provision for this expenditure must be made in the Defence budget along with the provision for Army and Royal Air Force charges and must be under the ultimate control of the Defence Minister. This arrangement is not incompatible with separate control under delegated powers by the Political, Army, and Royal Air Force authorities of their separate portions of the grant, but it does provide for co-ordination by the ultimate authority, and for a single financial control of all the defence organisation which will make for economy and the most efficient utilisation of public money.

154. The acceptance of the proposals made in the various parts of the report will secure to Government an ultimate reduction in recurring expenditure of just under half a crore of rupees (Rs. 49·56 lakhs): this saving will be achieved, as we elsewhere make clear, only if the units of the Covering Troops, of which we propose the reduction, are actually disbanded. This is not the limit of the economies which we think can be made; as we have indicated in Part III of the report, reductions will probably be found possible in other formations of the Army which will serve to finance the

increased outlay on aircraft\* that may be found to be necessary. We believe that our proposals regarding the localisation of troops will also tend towards economy of expenditure on personnel, equipment, and reliefs, but the extent of this economy it is obviously impossible to estimate. In our calculation of savings, allowance has been made for any extra recurring expenditure, apart from that on aircraft, we consider to be necessary. Acceptance of our proposals will commit Government to outlay, which will probably not exceed Rs. 36 lakhs in all, on the Razmak Wana road, on Scout Posts in Waziristan, and a militia post at Gul Kach, but on the other hand will render expenditure of Rs. 55·67 lakhs on the Wana Cantonment, and reconstruction of quarters at Drosh, no longer necessary. We trust that Government may find it possible to utilise some portion of these savings on the construction of the roads we mention below, and on improving conditions in transborder areas by roads, hospitals and other means.

\*The outlay on a heavy Transport Squadron is roughly as follows —

	Non-recurring Rs.		Recurring Rs.
Accommodation and landing grounds, etc.	22,50,000	Annual cost including airpark and Depot.	22,53,000
Equipment . . . .	47,20,000	....	
Total . . . . .	<u>69,70,000</u>		

## PART VII.

## MISCELLANEOUS.

155. **Arms trade.**—The chief seat of this traffic is the Kohat Pass, but there are subsidiary centres at Kaniguram and elsewhere. The weapons made in the Kohat Pass have a deceptive resemblance to the products of British arsenals, but being made of very much softer metal, with the rifling hand-turned on a lathe, soon wear out. They consequently command a very much lower price—Rs. 150—200 as against Rs. 500—900. The attitude of Government towards the industry has always been curiously indeterminate, and in the Kohat Pass it has now acquired the status of a vested interest, and its suppression would certainly give rise to claims for compensation and in all probability would only result in the shifting of the factories to some other less accessible centre. The general consensus of opinion seems to be that since the tribesmen in their present state of civilisation insist upon getting arms somehow, the balance of advantage lies in not placing too many obstacles in the way of their supplying their needs with a weapon of comparatively small military value. In this view we are prepared to acquiesce, but we think that it might be worth while to ascertain more accurately than appears to have been done hitherto the sources from which the raw materials are obtained, and the channels through which they reach the factories, so as to be able to control or check the supply at any time, should necessity arise.

156. **Captured Airmen.**—During the extensive air operations of 1930 there was fortunately no instance of an aircraft having to make a forced descent in tribal territory. The possibility is however one which cannot be disregarded and it is important that the measures taken to meet it should be standardised for all districts and laid down in advance. It is clear in the first place that operations against a tribe cannot be suspended because the occupants of one or more aircraft have been taken prisoner. No tribe must be able to secure immunity by using a prisoner as a hostage. On the other hand everything possible must be done to secure the proper treatment of prisoners.

We recommend :—

- (I) That the procedure to be followed should be uniform and noted to all authorities.
- (II) That a standard form should be carried by all officers and men of the Royal Air Force and other services when flying over tribal territory whether on a peaceful mission or on operations. This form should state that the bearer is flying on duty under the orders and protection of the Government of India ; that he is to be given good treatment and brought in safely to the nearest Government post at once upon which a suitable reward will be paid. If he is harmed, however, the Government of India will heavily punish those concerned.
- (III) That political action should also be taken immediately an aircraft is believed to have made a forced landing. Messengers should be sent in and leaflets, of which a stock should be maintained, dropped to the tribes concerned instructing them that the occupants are to be brought in. If operations are in progress against the tribe, it should be pointed out that these operations are going to continue in any case until the tribe has submitted, and that if any prisoner is harmed heavy punishment will be exacted.
- (IV) That officers and others flying on duty should also carry always a printed card with phrases in Pashtu which are likely to be useful in the event of a forced landing.
- (V) The reward to be paid will necessarily vary with the circumstances. It should be promptly paid, and its amount should be at the discretion of the political authorities concerned.



**157. Gaduns.**—The Gaduns are a tribe with about 5,000 fighting men resident on the Buner border. The rest of Buner, to its great advantage, has been brought under control by the Wali of Swat, but both he and the Nawab of Amb have been forbidden to interfere in Gadun country. Government however has done nothing whatever to improve their condition. The Gaduns are much torn by faction feuds and are said to have asked for the introduction of a loose form of administration and offered to pay a light revenue. Their country has some valuable forest on the upper slopes of Mahaban, the reckless exploitation of which it is important to prevent, but from which a revenue probably sufficient to pay the cost of some Khassadars and forest guards could be defrayed.

This appears to be a case where the Sandeman policy could be introduced at little or no expense and we consider that its possibilities should be examined at an early date.

## INTELLIGENCE.

**158. Central Intelligence Bureau.**—One of the most important lessons to be drawn from the events of the summer of 1930 is that there must be some organisation for weighing and sifting the information collected from the various sources, political, police, army and Royal Air Force, and for co-ordinating and combining it. The evidence before us suggests that, for various reasons into which it is not necessary to enter, intelligence on certain occasions was not entirely satisfactory, and that unless there is a central co-ordinating bureau, it is most difficult for the Chief Commissioner to get at the true facts of the situation from the mass of information, often unsatisfactory or conflicting, and sometimes emanating from sources which might be suspect. The formation of a Central Intelligence Bureau last summer was a measure of very great benefit to the Chief Commissioner and to Government and we consider that events have proved that the continuance of this Central Bureau in some form is necessary.

**159. Tribal Directories.**—In connection with intelligence we desire to draw attention to the importance of the preparation and maintenance of tribal directories. The tribal directory comprises air photographs in detail of the whole tribal area with information as to the names of geographical features of the villages, and of the occupiers of identifiable houses. This directory is essential for the proper direction of bombing operations, and should be prepared and maintained by the combined efforts of the political, military and Royal Air Force organisations. It must be subject to continual revision and check. We understand that a directory which had been prepared for Waziristan a few years ago had not been kept up to date, a circumstance which emphasises the necessity for careful maintenance and constant revision.

## MOHMANDS.

**160.** We have dealt in paragraph 3C(b) with the suggestion for extending the area of control in Mohmand country and the means by which this might be done, when the occasion arises. Our present recommendation is purely administrative. The Mohmands, being a partly Afghan tribe, are peculiarly amenable to suggestion from Afghanistan, which is usually hostile, and they are of inflammable temperament. In consequence they have provided a succession of alarms in past years of which their proximity to Peshawar has perhaps tended to exaggerate the importance. The Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, who is the officer in political charge of the tribe, has for years not had time to get to know them as thoroughly as is desirable and we understand that when the disturbances of 1930 began the Chief Commissioner was embarrassed because no officer of the Political Department was available with the detailed knowledge of the tribe which was required. The Mohmands have settled in large numbers in the Peshawar District, mostly in the Hashtnagar tract, and it is impossible to divorce the Deputy Commissioner from ultimate responsibility for the direction of their affairs. We think, however that his task would be facilitated if

the Assistant Commissioner, Charsadda, were always *ex-officio* in charge of the Mohmands, under the Deputy Commissioner, just as the Assistant Commissioner, Hangu, is in charge of the Orakzai or the Assistant Commissioner, Tank, in charge of the Bhitannis. As the Charsadda Sub-Division is already a very heavy burden, we think that the Assistant Commissioner should be given a full-powered Extra Assistant Commissioner to take a large measure of case work off his shoulders.

## OUTLAWS.

161. **The outlaw problem.**—No survey of our problem can be complete without a reference to the treatment of the outlaws who have absconded for offences ranging from petty larceny to murder and have found sanctuary across the border. The maliks or tribesmen with whom these outlaws find refuge are not prepared to support in idleness a stranger to their community and in order to make some return the outlaw is forced to find the means of payment as often as not by further crime in the settled districts or by acting as a guide to raiding gangs of tribesmen. In carrying out robbery or daccity he is helped by his friends and relations in the village from which he has fled, so that the presence of an outlaw near the border of administered territory constitutes a continual menace to its peace and security.

162. Policy with regard to outlaws has been the subject of discussion since the British Government in India assumed responsibility for administration up to the border. We have no new suggestion to make and can only reiterate the principles which have come to be recognised as those governing the policy and which were emphasised by the Civil Armed Forces Committee,

- (a) The classification of outlaws into the two categories of the more and the less dangerous criminals should receive continuous attention. Efforts should be made by political officers through tribal maliks, and by district officers through the relatives of the absconders, to secure the return of an outlaw of the latter class back to the ordinary life of his village, while efforts equally should be directed to bringing the dangerous criminals to justice, or to removing them far from the border.
- (b) Constant pressure is required on the part of political officers to influence the maliks with whom outlaws have taken refuge either to surrender them to justice, or to pass them on to tribes at a distance from the border, or to provide security for their good behaviour. Evidence is not wanting that political control in this respect has not always in the past been as strong as it might have been in the case of the Afridis, and the existence of nests of outlaws in various places on the Peshawar border points to the necessity of tightening this control. Action in this direction might be taken in connection with the Afridi settlement.
- (c) Serious crime by outlaws or raiding gangs will ordinarily not occur without the connivance of persons residing in administered territory, and deterrent action must be taken against such persons as are found guilty of such connivance.
- (d) It is a moot point whether "cutting out" raids by Frontier Constabulary to secure outlaws living near the border are politically expedient, and the policy in regard to such raids has changed more than once in the last ten years. We think that every proposed raid of this kind must be considered on its merits and in relation to possible repercussions, but consider that nothing in the way of a self-denying ordinance against such action need be observed. A few such successful raids might reinforce the authority of the political officers.
- (e) Every effort should be made to extend the employment of Khassadars, as tribal police, against outlaws: while they may not be able to secure the person of the outlaw they may be effective in obtaining the return of property stolen by the outlaw.

163. **Transfers.**—We were much struck by facts which came to our notice showing how frequent are transfers of officers in the North-West Frontier Province. We are aware that the difficulties of avoiding this with a small cadre are great, but we were unable in the time at our disposal to go into the question whether more could not be done to overcome these difficulties. Our recommendation must therefore be confined to a suggestion that the Government of India call for a report on the subject from the Chief Commissioner.

#### THE SHIA SALIENT.

164. **Location and importance.**—The so-called Shia Salient is a strip of tribal territory running westward beyond the administrative border of the Kohat District from the vicinity of Marai post. It includes the Karez valley and crossing the watershed of this stream, extends to the Mastura valley in the neighbourhood of Kalaya. The importance of this area lies in the fact that it is a wedge of Shia Orakzai country surrounded by Sunni sections of that tribe and from its western end gives easy access to central Tirah. The history of this small area has been stormy and the stronger Sunni clans, both Afridi and Orakzai, have made repeated and desperate efforts to evict the Shias who have come to rely more and more on the support and protection of the Government of India. In 1927 these Shia Orakzai were ejected from all but a small fringe of their territory and it was only in 1930, by the good offices of Government, after prolonged negotiation and after considerable tribal tension, that the restoration of their ancestral lands was secured for the Shias under certain guarantees. The Shia Orakzai have been given some measure of assistance towards the maintenance of their position by payment of 309 temporary levies to form the nucleus of defence to resist invasion. The Shia Orakzai provides one of the most reliable Pathan elements in the various armed forces.

165. **Extension of control in the Shia Salient.**—The Shia Orakzai have from time to time besought Government to take over the responsibility for their country, but this action has always met with opposition from their Sunni neighbours. In the agreement of March 1930 made by the Chief Commissioner with the Afridi and the Sunni Orakzai on the occasion of the restoration of their country to the Shias, Government undertook to refrain from actual occupation of the Shia Salient on condition of good behaviour on the part of the other contracting tribes. How far this agreement has been invalidated by the subsequent Afridi hostilities is a matter we have not been able to examine, but we consider that when it is possible to extend control and protection without using force Government should respond to the invitation of the Shias. We believe that no extra cost would be involved, and that the valleys of the Salient might be developed and yield some return in the way of a light assessment of land revenue. More important, however, is the consideration that it might then be possible to extend the existing road to Kalaya and to begin a process of peaceful penetration in this area which in time might make its influence felt in Tirah and so help materially towards a satisfactory solution of the Afridi problem. We believe that the influence of a road to Kalaya in promoting civilisation in Tirah would be very great,

#### ENLISTMENT OF TRANS-BORDER PATHANS.

166. **Trans-border Pathans in Regulars.**—In 1914 there were nearly 5,000 trans-border Pathans serving in the army, of whom about half were Afridis. In the first 10 months of the War over 600 of the latter deserted and there were also numerous dismissals and discharges for misconduct. The behaviour of other trans-border Pathans was not a great deal better. As a result, in November 1915 recruitment of all trans-border Pathans was stopped, and by the end of 1918 the total number in the army had dwindled to less than 1,800.

After the War the army was urged by the political authorities to re-open enlistment on the grounds that such employment would enable the Pathan to earn an honest livelihood. The tribes selected by the political authorities were the Malikdin and Kambar Khel Afridis and certain Orakzai sections.

Afridis in the Regular Army at present are as follows :—

1/13th F. F. Rifles	..	..	2 Platoons Kambar Khel.
4/13th F. F. Rifles	..	..	1 Company Malikdin Khel.
2/14th Punjab Regiment	..	..	1 Company Malikdin Khel.

The Orakzai have one Platoon in each of the battalions of the 12th F. F. Regiment, *i.e.*, five platoons in all.

The number of trans-border Pathans serving in other regular units is negligible. It has been specified by Army Headquarters that trans-border Pathans will not be employed against their own fellow tribesmen, though they may be employed in other frontier campaigns. We do not consider that this restriction to their employment can, with safety, be withdrawn.

**167. Trans-border Pathans in Scouts and Militias.**—In Scouts and Militia trans-border Pathans are employed as under :—

	Tirah Afridis.	Kohat Pass Afridis.	Orakzai.	Mahsuds.	Wazirs.
Kurram Militia . . . . .	..	..	..	109	..
Tochi Scouts . . . . .	217	203	329	..	97
South Waziristan Scouts . . . . .	256	268	325	..	..
Zhob Militia . . . . .	80*	160*	320*	..	..

With the exception of the Wazirs in the Tochi Scouts, none of the above are employed, or are liable to be employed, in or near their own tribal area. Herein lies a difference between the employment of tribesmen in irregulars and regulars. The former units are localised while the latter are, or should be, as at present constituted, liable for service anywhere.

**168. Objections to Afridis in Regulars.**—Since Afridi enlistment was reopened in 1921, the conduct of the men has been very good, with the exception of one incident which led to the temporary closing of Kambar Khel enlistment. Their behaviour throughout recent hostilities with their tribe has been excellent. But the presence of Afridis in three regular Infantry units precludes employing those units on the Afridi front and it is doubtful whether any commander would care to take the risk of including them in operations against Afghanistan. Two of these battalions were actually in a formation which was sent as a reinforcement to Peshawar last summer. They had to be detached from their brigade and used for internal security duties, which action caused much heart burning throughout the units including the Afridis themselves. In addition, it led to a reshuffling of units and sudden and undesirable changes in the composition of formations.

The presence of Afridis in the army is also unsatisfactory from the point of view of keeping them up to strength in war. The Orakzai have been allowed to accept normal conditions of service with the colours and in the Reserve, but there is no Reserve service in the case of the Afridis. Consequently it would be difficult to mobilise and impossible to maintain Afridi sub-units as such in war.

In view of the above considerations we consider that subject to what is said in paragraph 169 below, the correct course to adopt is to dispense altogether with the services of Tirah Afridis in the regular army.

**169. Policy recommended.**—The presence of trans-border Pathans in the regular army is from a purely military point of view an embarrassment instead of a source of strength, but we realise that their enlistment is very desirable from the political point of view and that it is difficult to exclude entirely

\*Approximately.

such good fighting material from the army. Our recommendation is that trans-border Pathans should only be enlisted from areas over which Government has acquired sufficient control to—

- (a) make hostilities unlikely,
- (b) make control of reservists possible,
- (c) make desertion, without apprehension, difficult.

**Kohat Pass Afridis.**—Within this category we would include the Kohat Pass Afridis. We think that enlistment might be opened ostensibly as a reward for their staunchness in 1930 and that the offer of accepting recruits might be made conditional on a tribal agreement to surrender all deserters. Possibly further concessions giving greater freedom of movement to political officers might also be obtained.

Enlistment of tribesmen should be on the clear understanding that they would be liable for service anywhere including Tirah.

**Mahsuds.**—We think that the time is very nearly, if not quite, ripe for opening recruitment of Mahsuds. If some such agreement as we have suggested in the case of the Pass Afridis could be made, we would recommend enlistment at once.

In the very early stage of Mahsud enlistment before and at the beginning of the Great War a few regrettable incidents occurred. But the Mahsuds who served overseas in France and East Africa made a great name for their tribe as soldiers, and officers who served with them in the field consider that they cannot be surpassed as fighting men. Moreover throughout the Great War only three Mahsuds deserted from the field, although at the time Government exercised no control at all over Mahsud territory.

**Wazirs.**—Wazirs do not make such good soldiers as Mahsuds and are not so desirous of army employment. We do not recommend their enlistment at present.

**Orakzai.**—The Orakzai are in our opinion an exception to the general rules which should govern enlistment and we consider that continued service in the regulars should be given as a reward for the good behaviour of the tribe as a whole last summer, and in recognition of the fact that the Orakzai have in the past rendered much more loyal service than the Tirah Afridis. Enlistment of Orakzai Shias should be especially encouraged.

**170. Adjustments in Scouts and Militias.**—For the reasons already given we do not consider that the exclusion of Afridis from the regulars need be extended to the irregular corps, where their service has been satisfactory. The total numbers of trans-border men which can be employed in Scouts and Militia is limited by the policy which lays down that not more than 1/3 of the strength of a corps shall be recruited trans-border. Until such time as it is considered safe to increase this proportion no increase in the total number of trans-border men can be made.

Minor re-adjustments may be possible, and are considered in the paragraphs dealing with the various corps of Militia and Scouts.

## PART VIII.

### SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS.

No. 171. We attach a summary of our main recommendations, with references to the paragraphs of our report in which each subject is treated.

#### PART I.

##### INTRODUCTORY.

(1) There cannot be any radical change or reversal of tribal policy. [Paragraph 18 (a)].

(2) We cannot envisage any large scale extension of a policy of occupation, initiated by force. [Paragraph 18 (b)].

(3) Government should aim at the peaceful penetration and civilisation of the tribes. [Paragraph 18 (c)].

(4) For financial reasons we anticipate that it will be necessary to aim at a gradual curtailment of expenditure. [Paragraph 18 (d)].

#### PART II.

### NORMAL POLITICAL CONTROL.

##### TRIBAL ALLOWANCE.

(5) Tribal allowances must continue, cannot be reduced, but may be subject to readjustment. (Paragraphs 19—23).

(6) Maliks might be encouraged to devote their stipends or parts of them to the common benefit. (Paragraph 24).

##### KHASSADARS.

(7) Neither in the Khyber Agency, nor in Waziristan is it possible to reduce the pay of Khassadars now employed by Government. The basic wage of new recruits might however be reduced from Rs. 30 p. m. to Rs. 25 p. m. [Paragraph 30 (a)].

(8) Unless political and financial conditions render possible a policy of peaceful penetration in Mohmand country the force of Mohmand Khassadars should be gradually extinguished. [Paragraph 30 (b)].

(9) Efforts should be made to avoid permanent commitments in connection with the Razmak-Wana Road, and if additional recruitment is necessary, to reduce the basic wage from Rs. 30 p. m. to Rs. 25 p. m. [Paragraph 30 (c)].

##### THE ECONOMIC WEAPON.

(10) Blockade is not generally an effective weapon ; if however it is applied, a system of licensing the trade in articles for which tribesmen are dependent on British India is worthy of consideration. (Paragraph 32).

##### DISTRICT LEVIES.

(11) Except in Kohat District and in the Pezu Pass District Levies should be abolished ; Government rifles should be generally resumed and the Arms Act rigorously enforced. (Paragraph 36).

(12) In Kohat District, including the Shia Salient, levies should be generally retained. (Paragraph 37).

## FRONTIER CONSTABULARY.

(13) In the light of recent events and future developments we consider that two of the recommendations of the Civil Armed Forces Committee are no longer practicable, namely, the gradual replacement of Frontier Constabulary by Levies, and secondly, the final merging of the Frontier Constabulary into the District Police. (Paragraphs 41 and 42).

(14) Impending constitutional changes make it necessary to keep the District Police and Frontier Constabulary as separate entities. (Paragraph 42).

(15) The Commandant, Frontier Constabulary, should remain directly under the Chief Commissioner and not be placed under the Inspector General of Police. (Paragraph 43).

(16) In all districts except Peshawar the strength of the District Police should be calculated on the assumption that the Frontier Constabulary is available as an armed reserve. (Paragraphs 44).

(17) No change in the trans-border element in the Constabulary is required nor is any permanent extension of trans-border responsibilities advisable. (Paragraph 45).

(18) Besides two temporary platoons, six platoons of infantry and five sections of mounted infantry can be reduced or made available for other duties when conditions return to the normal. (Paragraph 46).

(19) Permanent provision should be made for the reserve of the Frontier Constabulary. [Paragraph 47 (a)].

(20) A special local allowance of Rs. 3 per month should be sanctioned for service in the Tank and Drazinda areas. [Paragraph 47(b)].

(21) A bonus of Rs. 100 should be granted for six years' completed service. [Paragraph 47(c)].

(22) Proposed alterations in the present strength together with suggestions as to seasonal distribution are contained in Appendix IV.

## SCOUTS AND MILITIAS.

(23) As a general principle we endorse the views of the Civil Armed Forces Committee that the number of posts should be kept as low as possible, and we recommend in this connection seasonal distribution of garrisons. We stress the importance of landing grounds in proximity of posts. This should be taken into consideration when the sites of new posts are selected. (Paragraph 52).

(24) We do not consider that the principle of the location of Scout posts within reach of support by regular troops can be abandoned. (Paragraph 54).

(25) We recommend the provision of post guns and wireless telegraphy in some of the larger posts and some additional mechanical transport. (Paragraph 55).

(26) We recommend no present change in the composition and equipment of Scouts and Militias. (Paragraphs 56 and 57).

(27) We consider that a small and carefully selected element of local enlistment should be aimed at as a general principle, but the time has not yet arrived when Mahsuds can be enlisted in the South Waziristan Militia. (Paragraphs 61 and 62).

## CIVIL ARMED FORCES IN BALUCHISTAN.

(28) We consider that Mahsuds might be substituted for Brahuīs in the Zhob Militia. [Paragraph 65(a)].



(29) We do not agree in the proposal to recruit additional men for the better control of Kakar Khorassan, but recommend that control in this area should be carried out through existing agencies and seasonal distribution. [Paragraph 65(b)].

(30) We recommend that the decision to abandon the construction of a post at Gul Kach should be reconsidered. [Paragraph 65(c)].

(31) We do not recommend any permanent increases in the Mekran and Chagai Levy Corps pending the results of a full enquiry into the Baluchistan Levies. In any case we consider alterations in strength should be made largely by way of redistribution. (Paragraph 66).

(32) **Miscellaneous Scouts and Levies.**—We suggest that full enquiry into the Baluchistan Levy system be conducted by an experienced officer. (Paragraph 68).

### PART III.

#### EXERGENCY CONTROL, DEFENCE, AND THE ARMED FORCES OF THE CROWN.

(33) Our discussions and conclusions regarding frontier defence and the use of air power will be found in paragraphs 69—79.

(34) We recommend that orders in pursuance of the decision already arrived at by the Government of India to provide one Heavy Transport Squadron should be issued during the year 1931-32, and we consider that when funds are available a second similar squadron will be justified on general considerations of defence and finance. (Paragraph 80).

(35) We do not consider that any material departure from the orders already existing in respect of the co-ordination and mutual relations of the different forces, including Royal Air Forces maintained on the frontier, is necessary. We do, however, consider that definite instructions should exist providing for the delegation of a senior staff officer from the army and a similar officer of the Royal Air Force to be attached to the chief political authority concerned as soon as air action under political control is initiated and we recommend that the existing instructions should be revised in the light of the above. (Paragraphs 81 to 93).

#### COVERING TROOPS (OTHER THAN WAZIRISTAN), CHITRAL.

(36) We recommend the withdrawal of the Chitral garrison when the Chitral Scouts have been reorganised. In making this recommendation we assume that a Heavy Transport Squadron will be in existence. (Paragraphs 93 to 97).

#### PESHAWAR DISTRICT (EXCLUDING CHITRAL).

(37) We recommend that the garrison required for the holding of the Khajuri and Aka Khel plains should consist of regulars and should be found from existing strength of the Peshawar District. (Paragraphs 99 and 100).

(38) We consider that a reduction of artillery could be made. (Paragraph 102).

#### KOHAT DISTRICT.

(39) We have no recommendations to make for any immediate reduction, but consider that when the wishes of the Shia Orakzai for some extension of control over their area have been met, it might be possible to make over the Samana to the Frontier Constabulary. (Paragraphs 103 to 105).

(40) In the Kurram Militia we do not recommend any permanent increase. (Paragraph 107).

(41) We recommend that the small Militia garrison required for the Royal Air Force post at Arawali should be found by handing over old Arawali post and Chapri post to Turi levies. (Paragraph 107).

#### BALUCHISTAN.

(42) We suggest no change in the military dispositions in the Zhob. The substitution of Scouts at Wana for regular troops may affect the position in the Zhob, and the strength of the garrison of the Zhob in this event will require consideration. (Paragraphs 113 and 114).

(43) We recommend the reduction of the battalion at Pishin. (Paragraph 116).

(44) The summary of the present reductions in Covering Troops which we recommend is detailed in paragraph 117. Their financial effect is given in paragraph 119. (Paras. 117 and 119).

(45) We have suggested for consideration that a portion of the regular troops located on the frontier might with advantage be localised and their training and equipment reviewed accordingly. (Paragraphs 120 to 129).

#### PART IV.

#### WAZIRISTAN.

##### POLICY.

(46) Our discussions and conclusions with regard to the future of Waziristan and their financial effects are contained in paragraphs 130 to 136. Our main recommendations are—

(1) the completion of the Razmak-Wana road.

(2) the location of Scout posts at Ladha and Wana and of a seasonal post at Hathi Khel.

(3) the withdrawal in due course of the regular garrison at Wana, *vide* programme contained in paragraph 138.

(47) We propose the immediate replacement of regulars at Manzai by Frontier Constabulary, but no change in the disposition of regular troops in Bannu Brigade. We suggest that only the troops now located at Idak should be transferred to Mir Ali. (Paras. 137 and 138).

(48) We anticipate that some increase in Khassadars will be entailed by the construction of the Razmak-Wana road. (Paras. 119 and 138).

##### WAZIRISTAN SCOUTS.

(49) We do not consider that the command of the Waziristan Scouts should normally be vested in the military commander in peace time. If political authority passes to the military the Scouts would automatically pass under military command and so also in minor operations when they co-operate with regulars. (Para. 141).

(50) It may be found in the future that the Scout garrisons of the Khajuri and Shinki sectors in the Tochi can be reduced.

If this takes place, any such reduction will be required to set off any increase in Scouts found necessary to implement the proposed policy in South Waziristan. (Para. 142).

(51) In South Waziristan we recommend giving up the posts at Splitoi, Chagmalai and Kotkai and thus by re-distribution providing the necessary garrison for the new post at Ladha. (Paragraph 143.)

(52) We recommend a seasonal post at Hathi Khel in the upper Baddar Valley, to be occupied in the summer months only, the necessary garrison being found from Jandola, Sarwakai and Sorarogha. (Paragraph 143.)

(53) We recommend that the Scout garrison at Wana, when the regulars are withdrawn, should consist of not less than 10 platoons. This will probably necessitate fresh recruitment though possibly some platoons may be found by redistribution in the Tochi. (Paragraph 143)

(54) In the event of Scouts taking over Wana, the South Waziristan Scouts should be divided into two wings with a common headquarters at Jandola and commanded by an officer of the rank of Lt.-Colonel. (Paragraph 144.)

## PART VI.

### ROADS AND POSTS.

(55) We consider that the development of roads, both metalled and unmetalled, is of primary importance and our recommendations are given in order of priority. (Paragraphs 147 to 150).

(56) The construction of expensive permanent posts should be avoided. (Paragraph 151).

(57) Standard patterns of posts to provide accommodation for any given number of men should be adopted. (Paragraph 151).

(58) Posts no longer required should be razed. (Paragraph 151).

## PART VI.

### FINANCIAL.

(59) We consider that a single financial control of all the defence organisations which includes Political, Army, Royal Air Force, Civil Armed Forces and connected Works expenditure is essential and we consider that the present arrangement by which provision for the different parts of the defence organisations has been made in separate non-voted grants controlled by different authorities is unsound. (Paragraph 153.)

## PART VII.

### MISCELLANEOUS.

(60) We recommend the retention of the Central Intelligence Bureau at Peshawar. (Paragraph 158).

(61) The preparation and maintenance of "tribal directories" should form one of the duties of the Frontier Intelligence organisations. (Paragraph 159).

(62) We consider that the Assistant Commissioner, Charsadda, should be ex-officio in charge of the Mohmands, under the Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, and he should be given a full-powered Extra Assistant Commissioner to assist him in his case work. (Paragraph 160).

(63) The policy with regard to outlaws recommended by the Civil Armed Forces Committee should be retained. (Paragraph 161 and 162).

(64) We consider that Government should respond to the invitation of the Shia Orakzai to extend control and protection in the Shia Salient and we recommend that when this is done consideration should be given to extending the existing road as far as Kalaya. (Paragraph 165).

(65) We recommend that as a general rule trans-border Pathans should only be enlisted for the army from areas over which Government have acquired some special measure of control. (Paragraph 169).

(66) The enlistment of Orakzai, especially Orakzai Shias, should however be continued. (Paragraph. 169).

E. B. HOWELL.

W. G. H. SALMOND.

*Air Marshal.*

S. F. MUSPRATT,

*Major-General.*

A. C. BADENOCH.

*The 26th March 1928.*

## APPENDIX I.

## QUESTIONNAIRE.

## A.—POLITICAL CONTROL.

(i) *General*—

1. What in your opinion are the chief factors in the tribal problem ?
2. Do you regard the problem as complicated by the economic factor ?
3. If so, what importance in relation to the whole do you attach to that factor ?
4. What would in your opinion constitute a final solution of the tribal problem—
  - (1) politically ;
  - (2) economically ?
5. Do you consider the blood feud as one of the root causes of the economic problem ?
6. If not, what are in your opinion the main causes of the economic problem ?
7. Have you any other remarks or suggestions with regard to the tribal problem as a whole in its political and economic aspects which you desire to offer ?

(ii) *Economic factors*—

8. What are your views about the “economic weapon”?
9. For what commodities do your tribes depend on British India ?
10. What do they export in return ?
11. Have they any industries or resources which could be developed ?
12. Have they any sources of supply for their wants or markets for their produce other than British India ?
13. If so, where, and to what extent are they normally dependent on these ?
14. Is a blockade of your tribes in your opinion practicable ?
15. Is it likely to be effective ?
16. Do you see any advantage in introducing a system of license for the sale of certain commodities in the towns of the North-West Frontier Province or for their export from British India to tribal territory ?

(iii) *Tribal allowances*—

17. Do you regard tribal allowances as a possible means of solving the economic problem ?
18. What are the objects for which tribal allowances are given ?
19. Are they—
  - (a) to secure goodwill ; or
  - (b) as a return for facilities given or compensation for rights assumed ; or
  - (c) to provide salaries for selected persons through whom Government find it convenient to conduct business ?
20. Do you regard them as of any efficacy as a steadying factor in times or unrest ?
21. Do you advocate the extension of the system of tribal allowances to any tribes in or near the region with which you are at present concerned ?

22. If so, to which tribes, on what sort of scale and for what reasons ?
23. Do you consider the reduction or extinction of a tribal allowance once granted as feasible ?
24. Do you consider an increase of allowances to any of the tribes with which you are concerned as (a) necessary or (b) desirable ?
25. If so, on what grounds ?

(iv) *Methods\**—

26. Do you advocate a greater measure of interference in tribal territory ?
27. If so, in what regions, by what methods and for what objects ?
28. What other measures do you advocate as conducive to your final solution ?
29. Have you any other remarks or suggestions to offer on any aspects of the tribal problem as a whole on which you have not touched under question 7 ?

B.—DEFENCE AND THE EMPLOYMENT OF FORCE.

(i) *District Levies.*—

30. For border defence are you in favour on principle of an armed population organised so far as necessary in Levies to protect themselves against raiders, or of a disarmed population relying for protection mainly on the forces of Government ?
31. Do you think that members of a District Levy should be expected to be whole-time men ?
32. Define the duties of a member of a District Levy Corps.
33. What do you think should be the basic wage of a District Levy ?
34. What role would you assign to the Khan in the organisation and maintenance of District Levies ?
35. What is the existing strength and approximate cost per annum of District Levies maintained in your district ?
36. What increase or decrease or redistribution do you recommend in the force of District Levies maintained in your district ?
37. As regards the organisation and control of District Levies, have the conclusions and recommendations† of the Civil Armed Forces Committee been adopted in your district ?
38. Do you agree with those conclusions and recommendations ?
39. If not, what modifications do you suggest ?
40. What are or should be in your opinion the obligations of Government in respect of a member of a District Levy Corps killed or wounded in action against raiders ?
41. Have you any other remarks or suggestions in respect of District Levies to offer ?

(ii) *Frontier Constabulary*—

42. What is the existing strength and approximate cost per annum of the Frontier Constabulary employed on your District border ?
43. Do you accept the definition of the duties‡ of the Frontier Constabulary made by the Civil Armed Forces Committee ?
44. Do you advocate any increase or decrease or redistribution of the Frontier Constabulary in your district ?

\* Before answering these questions officers are requested to read through the questions in part C below.

† Part II, paragraph 15 (a), page 13 of the Committee's report.

‡ Part I, Section 2, paragraph 17, pages 4 and 5, *ibid.*

45. If so, on what grounds?

46. Do you accept the policy\* recommended by the Civil Armed Forces Committee to be progressively adopted in respect of the Frontier Constabulary?

47. As regards the duties and position of the District Officer, Frontier Constabulary, has effect been given to the views† of the Civil Armed Forces Committee in your district?

48. If not, how are the duties there indicated performed?

49. Do you agree with the views of the Civil Armed Forces Committee mentioned in question No. 47 above?

50. ‡Do you agree with the views § of the Civil Armed Forces Committee in respect of relations between the Inspector-General of Police and the Commandant, Frontier Constabulary?

51. What are or in your opinion should be the obligations of Government in respect of a member of the Frontier Constabulary killed or wounded in action against raiders?

52. Have you any other remarks or suggestions to make in respect of the Frontier Constabulary?

(iii) *Khassadars*—

53. What is the existing strength and approximate cost per annum of the Khassadar Force located in your district border in your Agency?

54. What proportion of that force is supplied by each of the tribes concerned?

55. What proportion does the number of Khassadars supplied by each tribe bear to the estimated fighting strength of that tribe?

56. What do you think the basic wage of a Khassadar should be?

57. Is any reduction either in numbers or rates of pay in your opinion feasible?

58. Define the duties of a Khassadar.

59. Do you recommend any increase or decrease or redistribution of the Khassadar force in your area?

60. If so, on what grounds?

61. Do you regard Khassadari as a possible means of solving the economic problem?

||62. Is any portion of the Khassadar force on your district border permanently located in British India?

||63. If so, why?

64. Are you in a position now to order your Khassadars to arrest and bring in for trial without safe conduct a tribal offender or outlaw from British India?

65. What is the standard of duties in this and other respects up to which Khassadars should in your opinion be required progressively to work?

66. What are or in your opinion should be the obligations of Government in respect of a Khassadar killed or wounded on duty?

\*Part II, paragraph 18, page 13; Part VII, paragraph 2, page 68 of the Committee's report.

†Part II, paragraph 15, Clauses (a), (b) (c), (d), (e), page 12, *ibid.*

‡To be answered only by Commandant, Frontier Constabulary, Inspector-General of Police, Resident in Waziristan and Chief Commissioner.

§Part II, paragraphs 17 to 19, page 13 of the Committee's report.

||District Officers only.



67. Have you any other remarks or suggestions in respect of Khassadars to offer ?

(iv) *Scouts and Militia*—

68. What is the existing strength and distribution and approximate cost per annum of the Scouts or Militia maintained in your area ?

69. Do you agree with the definition of the duties\* of Scouts and Militia made by the Civil Armed Forces Committee ?

70. Are you in favour of any extension of the duties [required of Scouts or Militia ?

†71. Do you agree with the proposals‡ made by the Civil Armed Forces Committee in respect of the ultimate re-organisation of the Waziristan Scouts ?

72. Do you advocate any increase or decrease or redistribution of the Scouts or Militia maintained in your area ?

73. Have you any suggestions as to the future recruitment, training or organisation of Scouts or Militia ?

74. Have you any views as to their future control—whether they should remain as at present under the Chief Commissioner or be transferred to Military ?

†75. Have you any recommendations as to the relations of the Resident in Waziristan with the Waziristan Scouts Corps or the delegation to him of any of his powers of control by the Chief Commissioner ?

76. What are the respective roles of regular troops and Scouts or Militia in trans-border areas ?

77. Assuming that the Royal Air Force are able to reinforce posts where landing grounds exist with Scouts or regular troops, to what extent in your opinion could the forces of regular troops now maintained across the border be replaced by Scouts or Militia ?

78. What are or should be in your opinion the obligations of Government in respect of a Scout killed or wounded on duty ?

79. Have you any other remarks or suggestions in respect of Scouts or Militia ?

(v) *Royal Air Force*—

80. Do you consider that the advent of air power has altered the tribal problem in a very marked degree ?

81. If so, how ?

82. What in your opinion are the advantages and disadvantages of the air weapon in comparison with troops—

(a) for the defence of the district border ; and

(b) for offensive operations in tribal territory ?

83. Do you consider that the use of the air weapon arouses more resentment than the use of force in other ways ?

84. Are you in favour of the continued use of the air weapon ?

85. If so, do you advocate the retention of the existing safeguards or their abolition or any modification of them ?

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\*Part I, Section 2, paragraphs 19—21, pages 5 and 6 of the Committee's report.

† To be answered only by Captain Hay, Major Parsons, officers connected with Waziristan, Inspecting Officer, Frontier Constabulary and Chief Commissioner.

‡Part V, Section 4, paragraphs 60—63, page 49 of the Committee's report.

86. Do you consider that the air arm without the use of troops for offensive purposes could force the submission of recalcitrant tribes ?
87. If so, do you think that the fact is recognised amongst the tribesmen and will become a progressively more important factor in preventing trouble in future.
88. Assume a position in which a hostile lashkar has managed to reach the district border. Assume that the district is adequately defended by troops and civil forces. Do you think that without the use of troops to invade tribal territory or for purposes of offence the air weapon alone employed against the lashkar, against its bases and the villages from which it comes would suffice to break it up and remove the menace ?
89. Do you consider that in view of the delay usually attendant upon the concerting of a tribal rising on a large scale the immediate application of the air weapon under the direction of the Political authorities can prevent the necessary unanimity amongst the tribes from being achieved ?
90. Can you quote any instance in the recent operations in which the issue of a warning to a tribe was sufficient to prevent them from giving further trouble and to restore the situation ?
91. If so, to what do you attribute the efficacy of the preventive action in these instances : to their own past experiences, their knowledge of what had happened in adjoining areas, lack of determination on their part or other causes ?
92. Can you quote any instance in the recent operations in which the issue of a warning to a tribe failed to prevent it giving trouble ? If so to what do you attribute the failure of the warning ?
93. Are you of opinion that an adequately defended Scout Post provided with water supply and rations should be able to hold out successfully against tribal attack if the Royal Air Force has a free hand to take offensive action against the attacking lashkars, their bases and the villages from which they are drawn ?
94. Would the Scouts themselves be satisfied in the event of their posts being besieged in relying on air action only without the co-operation of ground Forces ?
95. If so, do you think that the existing policy with regard to the location of Scout Posts in tribal territory (*viz.*, that they must be within reach of support from regular troops) can now safely be modified ?
96. What in your opinion should be the policy of Government in respect of captured airmen ?
97. Have you any other remarks or suggestions in respect of the Royal Air Force as a weapon of tribal control ?

(vi) *Regular Troops*—

98. Taking each military District in the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, including the Zhob (Independent) Brigade Area and with due regard to the power derived from the Royal Air Force, do you recommend any increase or decrease or redistribution of the regular troops and Royal Air Force ?

The possible replacement of regular troops by irregulars (or *vice versa*) referred to in question should be noted in this connection if you have any such proposals to make.

99. In your opinion do the experiences of 1930 indicate that any substitution of troops or irregulars by Royal Air Force can be undertaken ?
100. If so, in what areas and to what extent has this factor led to your conclusions under question 98 ?
101. Do you consider that any advantages would be gained by localizing regular troops—i.e., on the lines of a reversion to the Punjab Frontier Force ?
102. What further development of frontier communications (roads and/or railways) do you consider necessary ? To what extent would these requirements be modified by your recommendations under question 99 ?
103. Do you consider that our position could be improved and economy effected by any military fusion between Waziristan and the Zhob ? In such cases could the Waziristan District in whole or part be transferred to Western Command and where would the line be drawn between Northern and Western Commands ?
104. The policy of enlistment of trans-border Pathans in the Indian Army. Do you consider that our present policy with regard to Afridi and Orakzai enlistment should be altered either in the way of increase, decrease or cessation ? Do you consider that the enlistment of Mahsuds and Wazirs can and should now be contemplated either in addition to or substitution of the enlistment of Afridis and Orakzais ?
105. For the present it is proposed to hold any new posts constructed in the Khajuri and Aka Khel plains with regulars, one Battalion being found from the present garrison of Peshawar District (Landi Kotal Brigade) and the other from outside Peshawar District. Do you consider that subsequently these posts should be taken over by irregulars ? If so, what sort of irregulars ?
106. (i) Should the Government of India at any time decide upon the occupation of Tirah what garrison (regulars and irregulars) do you estimate would be necessary (a) to start with : (b) as the ultimate garrison : (c) to what extent is it likely that the ultimate garrison could be found by the redistribution of existing covering Troops ?
- (ii) What roads would be necessary to carry out this policy ?
- (iii) As an alternative, or preliminary measure, can you suggest any scheme of partial occupation or extension of our control in tribal territory, assuming complete occupation to be more than the Government of India are prepared to undertake ?
107. Do you consider that the present position of the Royal Air Force *vis-a-vis* the political authorities and the Army is satisfactory ? If not, what organization do you suggest ?

#### PART C.—SPECIAL PROBLEMS.

##### (i) Waziristan—

108. “ The policy in Waziristan is the control of Waziristan ”. How would you define control and what qualifications or modifications, if any, to this statement would you think necessary in present conditions ?
109. To what extent in your opinion is it true to say that the objects of Government's policy in Waziristan have so far been successfully achieved ?

110. What methods do you advocate for the further pursuit of that policy ?
111. If in your opinion Government have obtained any considerable measure of success in achieving the objects of their policy in Waziristan, do you attribute that success primarily to the presence and operations of troops, to the activities and influence of the Royal Air Force, to the roads and the political policy of penetration and civilisation, to the introduction of money earned by way of contracts or in Khassadari service, or to a combination of these or other factors ?
- 112 (a) To what extent have the metalled roads constructed in Waziristan contributed to the prosperity of the tribes ?
- (b) To what extent do the tribes use motor or other forms of transport on those roads ?
- (c) What additional road construction, metalled or unmetalled, do you advocate ?
113. Are any measures in your opinion practicable which would enable Government, while continuing its policy in Waziristan, to reduce expenditure in that region ?
114. The Government policy of permanently locating regular troops in Waziristan has been made known to the tribes. In what way do you think a reversal of this policy and the withdrawal of troops from any of our garrisons from Waziristan would be regarded by the tribes, and by Afghanistan ?
115. If the present garrisons of Razmak and Wana were withdrawn do you think that the roads could be kept open and the policy of Government continued by the use of Scouts and Khassadars only backed by the power of the Royal Air Force ?
116. If such a withdrawal were effected, Scout posts only being retained in the lower Tochi and at Miranshah and Jandola, what in your opinion would be the economic effect on the tribes ?
117. Supposing the withdrawal above indicated to have been successfully achieved without precipitating a tribal conflagration, do you think that the district border could thereafter be protected against raiding ?
118. Do you consider raiding an integral factor in the economic problem *i.e.*, can the tribes of Waziristan subsist without it ?
119. To what do you attribute the almost complete cessation of raiding into the Bannu and Derajat districts ?
120. What steps would in your opinion be practicable to improve economic conditions amongst the tribes after the withdrawal above indicated ? In the event of such withdrawal, do you think that the existing standard of intelligence services could be maintained ?
121. Do you consider that any advantages would be gained by placing Khassadars in Waziristan under the same organisation and control as the Scouts, or in any way affiliating them to the Scouts ?
122. If so, how ?
123. Have you any other remarks or suggestions with regard to Waziristan to offer ?

(ii) *Mohmands*—

- \*124. Have you any special observations to offer regarding the relations of Government with the Mohmand tribe or its political control ?
125. Have you any other remarks or suggestions in connection with the Mohmands to offer ?

(iii) *Miscellaneous*—

126. Have you any remarks or suggestions with regard to the arms trade in tribal territory to offer ?
127. Have you any views about tribal disarmament ?
128. Do you consider disarmament would be feasible without some form of military occupation of the area to be disarmed ?
129. Are there any special problems peculiar to your area on which you desire to offer any observation ?

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\* *Vide* Questions 24 to 27 above.

## APPENDIX II.

## DEFINITIONS AND EXPLANATIONS.

*Badragga*.—(Arabic—Going out to meet ; escort ; safe conduct).

Tribal safe conduct ; a tribal escort ; a tribesman temporarily employed for the protection of travellers or working parties ; the right of providing (and being paid for) protection in a certain area.

*Baramta*.—[Persian (*baramada*)—brought forward ; recovery.]

The system of enforcing vicarious responsibility by which any member of a tribe or section is liable to distress upon his person or property to make good the misdeeds of other members of the same tribe or section.

*Border*.—The boundary between British India and tribal territory.

*Chigha*.—(Pashtu—outcry).

Hue and cry ; pursuit party.

*Deraajat*.—(Persian—tents).

The places in the plains where certain Pathan tribes from the hills squatted, viz., Dera Ismail Khan, Dera Fatch Khan and Dera Ghazi Khan. In modern usage, with the separation of the North-West Frontier Province from the Punjab, the term has come to mean Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu.

*Elder*.—An influential tribesman who is not himself a recognised malik (q. v.). In some Agencies elders receive annual rewards in the form of lungis (q. v.).

*Frontier*.—(1) The frontier region generally.

(2) The frontier of India and Afghanistan known as the Durand Line.

*Frontier Remission*.—A remission of land revenue enjoyed by villages in exposed tracts or actually on the border. It usually amounts to  $\frac{1}{3}$  or  $\frac{1}{4}$  of the demand.

*Jirga*.—A tribal assembly, council or delegation.

*Khassadar*.—For the fundamental distinction between khassadars and levies—see Levy.

The term Khassadar has been defined :

“ A khassadar is the representative of his tribe within its area for carrying out its engagements with Government, but paid by Government. ”

*Lashkar*.—A tribal force which should in theory take the field under the tribal banner. The tribesmen composing a lashkar are in general armed with rifle, bandolier and cartridges and a dagger or two stuck in the waistbelt. Sufficient food for three or four days or even more is carried in a skin bag.

*Levy*—

## NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE.

Certain levies are maintained in tribal territory and in general these are so called because their weapons are supplied to them by Government and they receive a lower rate of pay than has become standard for khassadars. We are not, however, greatly concerned with these and in our report, when we refer to levies, unless the contrary is made clear from the context, we mean District Levies, i.e., tribesmen recruited from a tribe settled in British India, armed by Government, and in receipt of a basic wage in the neighbourhood of Rs. 15 p.m.

The fundamental distinction between District Levies and khassadars is that—

- (1) the levy is a cis-border formation ; the khassadar trans-border ;
- (2) the levy is armed by Government ; the khassadar provides his own weapon ;
- (3) the levy is employed in British India ; the khassadar functions, or should function, only in tribal territory, and is essentially tribal.

## BALUCHISTAN.

In Baluchistan, the Mekran, and Chagai levies are organised irregular formations. Elsewhere the levies are a sort of tribal police run through the tribal headmen on the lines laid down by Sandeman. They represent the khassadar of the North-West Frontier Province in a higher state of evolution on a lower rate of pay.

*Lungi*.—(Pashtu—a turban).

A turban ; a head dress of honour often accompanied by a reward or cash payment ; a cash payment ; an annual cash payment.

*Malik* and *Maliki*.—A tribal headman, who may be recognised as head of a whole tribe, or of one of its major or minor sub-division, or of a section or sub-section.

Maliki is the fraction of the tribal allowance paid to a malik.

*Mulla*.—A Muhammadan priest. The priesthood is not hereditary.

*Sarishta*.—The tribal organisation for the enforcement of Pathan custom or the apportionment of profit and loss amongst tribal sections.

*Shia*.—A Moslem sect to which the Turis some Orakzai and some Bangash sections belong.

*Sunni*.—A Moslem sect to which all the other tribes belong—*vide* Shia.

*Tribal territory*.—The country between the Border (q. v.) and the Frontier (q. v.).

*Tribes*.—The chief tribes of the North-West Frontier Province are :—

Tribes.	Population (estimated).
Afridis of the Khyber Agency . . . . .	230,000
Other Afridis . . . . .	45,000
Bajauris . . . . .	120,000
Dauris . . . . .	36,000
Mahsuds . . . . .	90,000
Mohmands . . . . .	65,000
Orakzai . . . . .	51,000
Shiranis . . . . .	12,000
Utman Khel . . . . .	130,000
Ahmadzai Wazirs . . . . .	63,000
Utmanzai Wazirs . . . . .	75,000
<b>Total</b> . . . . .	<b>917,000</b>

and of Baluchistan :—

*Pathan*—

Kakar . . . . .	93,000
Pani . . . . .	28,000
Shirani . . . . .	7,000
Tarin . . . . .	36,000
Miana . . . . .	6,000
Kasi . . . . .	1,000
<b>Total</b> . . . . .	<b>171,000</b>

*Baluch*—

*Eastern*—

Rind . . . . .	31,000
Magasi . . . . .	8,000
Marri . . . . .	23,000
Bugti . . . . .	23,000
Dombki . . . . .	6,000
Khetrani . . . . .	17,000
Umrani . . . . .	1,000
<b>Total</b> . . . . .	<b>109,000</b>

*Western* . . . . .

65,000

*Brahui*—

Original nucleus . . . . .	18,000
Sarawan . . . . .	52,000
Jhalawan . . . . .	87,000
Miscellaneous . . . . .	3,000
<b>Total</b> . . . . .	<b>160,000</b>



## APPENDIX III.

*Existing Tribal Allowances.*

District or Agency.	Tribes.	Amount.	District or Agency Total.	Remarks.
		Rs.	Rs.	
Hazara . . . .	Nawab of Amb . .	15,300	} 22,300	
	Black Mountain tribes	7,000		
Dir, Swat and Chitral Agency	H. H. the Mehtar of Chitral.	65,000*	} 1,68,210	*Includes Rs. 8,000 from Kashmir Durbar.
	Nawab of Dir . .	50,000		
	Wali of Swat . .	10,500		
	Other payments . .	42,710†		†Includes Rs. 1,200 from Kashmir Durbar.
Peshawar . . . .	Mohmands . . . .	55,728	55,728	
Khyber Agency . . . .	Loargi Shinwaris . .	32,000	} 3,11,120	
	Shilmanis . . . .	5,000		
	Mullagoris . . . .	5,000		
	Afridis . . . .	2,69,120		
Kohat District . . . .	Orakzai tribes . .	20,924	} 42,100	
	Kohat Pass tribes . .	21,176		
Kurram Agency . . . .	Kurram tribes . .	9,100	9,100	
Bannu District . . . .	Utmanzai Wazirs . .	6,000	} 24,000	
	Ahmadzai Wazirs . .	18,000		
North Waziristan Agency . .	Utmanzai Wazirs . .	75,700	} 95,900	
	Saidgis Wazirs . .	1,200		
	Dauris . . . .	19,000		
South Waziristan Agency . .	Ahmadzai Wazirs of Wana and Shakai.	25,200	...	
	Suleman Khels and Dotannis.	6,600	} 1,39,800	
	Mahsuds . . . .	1,08,000		
Dera Ismail Khan . . . .	Bhattani . . . .	11,220	} 17,472	
	Mainis . . . .	48		
	Sherannis . . . .	6,204		
	Total . .	8,85,730	8,85,730	

## APPENDIX IV.

*Statement of the Normal Present, and Proposed Strength of the Frontier Constabulary.*

## Platoons of infantry.

District.	Normal.	Present.	Proposed.	
Hazara . . . . .	4	3	4 } 2 }	In summer. In winter.
Peshawar—				
Shabkadar or Mohmand border . . . . .	8	10	8	
Peshawar or Afridi border . . . . .	15	18	16	
Kohat . . . . .	16	16	15	
Bannu . . . . .	11	11	9	
Dera Ismail Khan—				
Tank . . . . .	16	16	12	Two extra platoons in the winter.
Drazinda . . . . .	12	10	12	
Total . . . . .	82	84	76	

## NOTES.

*Hazara.*—The only post is Oghi. In the hot weather the full garrison is necessary to guard the Kagan Valley Road and the grazing grounds of Baliya. In the winter only so much is necessary as is sufficient to hold the fort. Two platoons should be removed to enable arrangements to be made for strengthening Tank and Drazinda to cope with the Powinda emigration in the winter. It should not be necessary to post a District Officer, Frontier Constabulary permanently to Oghi, and arrangements should be made whereby this appointment is saved.

## PESHAWAR.

(a) *Shabkadar.*—The temporary increase is due to the Mohmand menace of the summer of 1930. The proposed force is considered sufficient in normal times to hold the Monda and Michni posts with towers, and to garrison Shabkadar.

(b) *Peshawar.*—The normal distribution provides for 6 platoons in Peshawar, 3 in Bara Fort, and the balance in posts towards Jamrud, and round the Hassan Khel border. The temporary increase is due to demands in connection with the advance on to the Khajuri Plain. Proposals are under consideration that the Frontier Constabulary should find six platoons temporarily for Khajuri Plain. We consider that these should be found from the existing strength—3 from the Bara Fort area and 3 from the reserve. For normal conditions and in the permanent stage of the occupation of the Khajuri and Aka Khel Plains 6 platoons are provided as reserve, 3 for Bara Fort or the Frontier road area, two for the Pumping Station and one each for Shamshattu, Fort Mackeson, Aimul Chabutra, Spersang and Jani Garhi, the other posts already existing being reduced.

*Kohat.*—One platoon has been found by reducing Torawari.

*Bannu.*—Reduction is proposed of Kurram Garhi, Gambila and Tajauri.

## DERA ISMAIL KHAN.

(a) *Tank.*—Girni and Zam posts might be given up and one platoon of the Murtaza post, which will be held in the winter only.

(b) *Drazinda.*—No change in strength though change may be necessary in distribution.

The reduction in mounted infantry, which is already under discussion, has not been calculated with reference to specific posts.



















